University Trademarks and “Mixed Speech” on College Campuses: A Case Study of Gerlich v. Leath and Student Free Speech Rights by Converse, Nathan
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 28 XXVIII 
Number 4 Article 2 
2018 
University Trademarks and “Mixed Speech” on College Campuses: 
A Case Study of Gerlich v. Leath and Student Free Speech Rights 
Nathan Converse 
University of Iowa, College of Law, nathan-converse@uiowa.edu 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the First Amendment Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Nathan Converse, University Trademarks and “Mixed Speech” on College Campuses: A Case Study of 
Gerlich v. Leath and Student Free Speech Rights, 28 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 777 (2018). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol28/iss4/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
University Trademarks and “Mixed Speech” on College Campuses: A Case Study 
of Gerlich v. Leath and Student Free Speech Rights 
Cover Page Footnote 
University of Iowa College of Law (J.D., with distinction); Luther College (B.A. magna cum laude). Judicial 
law clerk for The Honorable John Telleen of the Iowa Business Court and Judges of the Seventh Judicial 
District of Iowa (2017–19). 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol28/iss4/2 
  777
University Trademarks and “Mixed 
Speech” on College Campuses: A Case 
Study of Gerlich v. Leath and Student 
Free Speech Rights 
Nathan Converse* 
Higher education has long been a fundamental building block 
upon which American democracy is based. The guarantee of free 
speech is itself a revered liberty in the American polity; it has, in 
turn, served as the catalyst for higher education. Recent events on 
college campuses continue to reexamine universities’ role in their 
students’ education and push the legal boundaries on student 
speech rights. In many instances, however, students’ speech and 
expressive viewpoint conflicts with that of other students. Other 
times, students’ speech conflicts with the expressive interests of 
their university. This Article examines the latter instance in the 
context of university trademarks. Gerlich v. Leath, a recent 
decision by the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals, serves as a case 
study to elaborate on the complexities that arise when analyzing 
free speech rights in instances where students’ expressive interests 
often compete with, and sometimes conflict with, those of public 
colleges and universities. 
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  INTRODUCTION   
Higher education has long been a fundamental building block 
upon which American democracy is based.1 The guarantee of free 
speech serves as the catalyst for higher education,2 which shares a 
revered place in the American polity and democratic form of self-
government.3 As the Supreme Court famously declared in 1969: 
“First Amendment rights, applied in light of the special 
characteristics of the school environment, are available to teachers 
and students. It can hardly be argued that either students or 
teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or 
expression at the schoolhouse gate.”4 Indeed, freedom of 
expression is imperative to a university’s mission of preparing 
students to become informed and engaged citizens.5 
                                                                                                             
1 See, e.g., Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954) (“Today, education is 
perhaps the most important function of state and local governments. Compulsory school 
attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate our 
recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the 
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It 
is the very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in 
awakening the child to cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, 
and in helping him to adjust normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that 
any child may reasonably be expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of 
an education.”); R. George Wright, Campus Speech and the Functions of the University, 
43 J. C. & U. L. 1, 8 nn.53–54 (2017) (quoting DEREK BOK, HIGHER EDUCATION IN 
AMERICA  1 (rev. ed. 2015)); Robert M. Hutchins, The College and the Needs of Society, 
3 J. GEN. EDUC. 175, 179, 181 (1949). 
2 “[T]he vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is nowhere more vital than in 
the community of American schools. The college classroom with its surrounding 
environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ and we break no new constitutional 
ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to safeguarding academic freedom.” Healy 
v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972). 
3 “Public education serves vital national interests in preparing the Nation’s youth for 
life in our increasingly complex society and for the duties of citizenship in our 
democratic Republic.” Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 278 (1988) 
(citing Brown, 347 U.S. at 493). 
4 Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Cmty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). 
5 Brown, 347 U.S. at 493. See also, e.g., Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 
603, 87 S. Ct. 675, 683 (1967) (“The vigilant protection of constitutional freedoms is 
nowhere more vital than in the community of American schools. The classroom is 
peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas.’ The Nation’s future depends upon leaders trained 
through wide exposure to that robust exchange of ideas which discovers truth out of a 
multitude of tongues, (rather) than through any kind of authoritative selection.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
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Despite the importance that the First Amendment plays in the 
intellectual and civic development of the American youth, 
expressive rights possessed by students are far from “clearly 
defined.”6 Indeed, First Amendment case law implicating the 
speech rights of students and their expressive interests as speakers 
becomes far more complex in the public school and university 
setting.7 Universities in particular are bastions of expressive 
thought—both academic and otherwise—and it is readily apparent 
that contrasting ideas will result in conflicting speech.8 Courts have 
contributed to this tension by failing to adhere to a single doctrine 
or framework in analyzing free speech claims brought by students 
against their universities.9 Without a coherently articulated 
framework by which to analyze expressive rights on university 
campuses and a proper consideration of the interests involved, 
neither students nor higher education institutions can properly 
function in harmony.10 
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeal’s recent addition to First 
Amendment jurisprudence in the higher education setting in the 
case Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III)11 contributes to a confusing and 
largely incoherent body of law surrounding the regulation of 
student speech rights on university campuses. While the first 
question at issue in Gerlich revolved around whether the public 
university had violated a student organization’s First Amendment 
rights by denying it use of its federally-registered trademark, the 
second question pertained to university officials’ individual 
                                                                                                             
6 “The mixture of muddled reasoning and inconsistent decisions invites needless 
litigation . . . While there is more than enough uncertainty to go around throughout all of 
the student speech case law, the adjudication of cases involving student speech in school-
sponsored activities is particularly chaotic.” Alan Brownstein, The Nonforum as a First 
Amendment Category: Bringing Order Out of the Chaos of Free Speech Cases Involving 
School-Sponsored Activities, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 717, 721 (2009). 
7 See generally Healy, 408 U.S. 169 (holding that the college administration had the 
burden to show why a student organization should not be recognized). 
8 Id. at 187. 
9 See generally Oyama v. Univ. of Hawaii, 813 F.3d 850 (9th Cir. 2015) (outlining the 
tensions of competing expressive interests in the higher education setting and noting 
different analytical approaches that various federal circuit courts have taken to this issue). 
10 See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 721. 
11 861 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2017).  
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liability for the constitutional tort.12 Naturally, the heart of this case 
hinged on whether it is “clearly established” under the law that the 
First Amendment rights of university students in recognized 
student organizations are violated when the student organization is 
denied unqualified use of their university’s federally-registered 
trademark.13 While the Eighth Circuit’s decision reached the right 
result in that post-hoc viewpoint discrimination is a never 
constitutionally-permissible reason for regulating student speech, 
the Eighth Circuit’s reasoning relied on an incomplete picture of 
the full range of expressive interests at stake. The purpose of this 
                                                                                                             
12 Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 704 (8th Cir. 2017) (addressing the 
university’s qualified immunity argument, framing the issue as evaluating whether the 
university “violated their First Amendment rights by engaging in viewpoint 
discrimination”). 
13 “Qualified immunity attaches when an official’s conduct ‘does not violate clearly 
established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have 
known.’ While this Court’s case law ‘does not require a case directly on point’ for a right 
to be clearly established, ‘existing precedent must have placed the statutory or 
constitutional question beyond debate.’ In other words, immunity protects ‘all but the 
plainly incompetent or those who knowingly violate the law.’” White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 
548, 551 (2017) (internal citations omitted). Recent commentators have attracted the 
attention of courts in arguing that the historical, legal, and constitutional justifications for 
qualified immunity do not justify its existence as a judicially-created doctrine. William 
Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful?, 106 CAL. L. REV. 45 (2018); Stephen R. 
Reinhardt, The Demise of Habeas Corpus and the Rise of Qualified Immunity: The 
Court’s Ever Increasing Limitations on the Development and Enforcement of 
Constitutional Rights and Some Particularly Unfortunate Consequences, 113 MICH. L. 
REV. 1219, 1244–50 (2015). See also Kisela v. Hughes, 138 S. Ct. 1148, 1162 (2018) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“This unwarranted summary reversal [of summary judgment 
in favor of the injured plaintiff] is symptomatic of a disturbing trend regarding the use of 
this Court’s resources in qualified-immunity cases. As I have previously noted, this Court 
routinely displays an unflinching willingness to summarily reverse courts for wrongly 
denying officers the protection of qualified immunity but rarely intervene[s] where courts 
wrongly afford officers the benefit of qualified immunity in these same cases. Such a 
one-sided approach to qualified immunity transforms the doctrine into an absolute shield 
for law enforcement officers, gutting the deterrent effect of the Fourth Amendment.”) 
(internal citations omitted); Ziglar v. Abbasi, 137 S. Ct. 1843, 1870 (2017) (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (“In further elaborating the doctrine of qualified immunity for executive 
officials, however, we have diverged from the historical inquiry mandated by the 
statute . . . . Because our analysis is no longer grounded in the common-law backdrop 
against which Congress enacted the 1871 Act, we are no longer engaged in interpret[ing] 
the intent of Congress in enacting the Act. Our qualified immunity precedents instead 
represent precisely the sort of ‘freewheeling policy choice[s]’ that we have previously 
disclaimed the power to make.”) (internal quotations omitted). 
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Article is to point out that, though incompatible with principles of 
“government speech,” concluding university-owned intellectual 
property creates a “limited public forum” for students’ use is not 
such a clear answer, even if it is ultimately proper to treat it as such 
for purposes of protecting vulnerable student speech from 
unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination under the First 
Amendment. 
This Article examines the Gerlich decision and elaborates on 
the complexities that arise when analyzing student speech rights, 
when such speech competes with, or even conflicts with, university 
interests.14 Specifically, this Article will review the court’s over-
simplification of the rights and interests at stake in the original 
opinion, and more thoroughly scrutinize the intricacies of student 
speech rights on university campuses—particularly in the area of 
university intellectual property.15 Though the Eighth Circuit’s 
ruling upon rehearing provides a more academically rigorous 
analysis than the original panel opinion, it nevertheless misses the 
analytical mark and fails to fully evaluate the student speech rights 
at stake. In Part I, this Article lays out the factual background and 
the interests of both sides upon which the Gerlich decision is 
rooted.16 Part II discusses the nuanced tensions that exist when 
examining First Amendment rights in the setting of a higher 
education institution—namely, that such circumstances present 
unique instances of “mixed speech,” where both the university and 
its students are expressing a message particular to their own 
interests.17 Part III analyzes both parties’ respective arguments in 
light of these complexities.18 This Article concludes that the issue 
                                                                                                             
14 See discussion infra Parts I, II. 
15 See id. 
16 See discussion infra Part I. 
17 See generally infra Part II. “Mixed speech” consists of instances of expressive 
activity that captures the interests—and implicates the rights—of both private and 
government actors. See Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both 
Private and Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 605, 627–40 (2008) (identifying five 
factors by which the category of “mixed speech” should be recognized: (1) the identity of 
the literal speaker; (2) the person or entity that controls the message; (3) the source of 
funding for the expression; (4) the “speech goal”; and (5) the party to whom a reasonable 
person would attribute the speech). 
18 See discussion infra Part III. 
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of university trademarks and student speech rights is much more 
nuanced than the Eighth Circuit has made it out to be—it is very 
much not clearly established law. The underlying problem in 
student free speech cases—which the Gerlich decision exemplifies 
particularly well—is that courts tend to view university First 
Amendment cases in a binary system: public university speech 
versus private student speech, emphasizing one to the exclusion of 
the other.19 Finally, Part IV lays out several points that courts 
should consider in future First Amendment litigation in the higher 
education setting, and recommends preventative steps that 
universities can take to limit their liability from First Amendment 
violation allegations in light of the Gerlich decision.20 
Student speech rights do not end at the schoolhouse gates, but 
it remains to be seen exactly how far they extend into the daily 
operations of a public university. This paper argues that the 
Gerlich decision would suggest that they are fairly invasive, and 
growing. But for reasons discussed below, there is reason to 
question the strength of the Gerlich opinion.21 The relevant 
question is not whether student speech rights should be curtailed 
on university campuses, but rather, to what extent student speech 
rights should prevail when they compete with—or conflict with—
the expressive interests of the university.22 
                                                                                                             
19 See infra Part II (describing how established First Amendment doctrines gloss over 
instances where a multiplicity of expressive interests are at stake, especially when applied 
in the higher education context); see also infra Part III (analyzing how the arguments 
advanced on both sides of the Gerlich decision implicate the same problems and similarly 
demonstrate mixed speech issues that require careful resolution). 
20 See generally infra Part IV. 
21 See infra Parts III & IV (contrasting the private speech forum analysis with 
government speech analysis and concluding neither adequately describes or considers the 
expressive interests at stake in Gerlich). 
22 Brownstein, supra note 6, at 729. 
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I. GERLICH V. LEATH 
A. Setting the Stage: NORML and Student Advocacy on College 
Campuses23 
Iowa State University (“ISU”) is a public land grant university 
located in Ames, Iowa, enrolling over 35,000 students and 
fostering more than 800 officially-recognized student organizations 
on its campus.24 One of these organizations is the Iowa Student 
Chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of Marijuana 
Laws (“NORML”).25 NORML is a nationally-affiliated student 
organization that advocates for reforming federal and state 
marijuana laws for both recreational and medicinal use.26 
ISU made its trademarks available for the use of student 
organizations, but requires that designs submitted by groups first 
obtain the approval of the university’s Trademark Licensing 
Office.27 The Trademark Office, in turn, was responsible for 
determining that the student organization’s proposed use of the 
trademark complies with ISU’s Guidelines for University 
Trademark Use by Student and Campus Organizations.28 As stated 
by the Trademark Office, the main goals of ISU’s trademark policy 
were to: 
 
                                                                                                             
23 The facts of Gerlich v. Leath, as discussed in this Article, pertain to those existing at 
the time of the incidents underlying the dispute as reflected in the decision before the 
district court and on appeal before the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals. 
24 Iowa State University Office of the Registrar, Enrollment Statistics, IOWA ST. U., 
http://www.registrar.iastate.edu/enrollment [https://perma.cc/VT3E-9Z7T] (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2018). 
25 Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 701 (8th Cir. 2017). See also 
Constitution of the Iowa State Chapter of the National Organization for the Reform of 
Marijuana Laws, ISU STUDENT ORGANIZATION DATABASE, 
https://www.stuorg.iastate.edu/site/normlisu [https://perma.cc/2UDP-9E3D] (last visited 
Oct. 9, 2018). 
26 Constitution of The Iowa State Chapter of the National Organization for the Reform 
of Marijuana Laws, supra note 25, at Art. I § 2. 
27 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701. See also Iowa State University Trademark Licensing 
Office, Trademark Management Policy Statement, IOWA ST. U. (2018), 
http://www.policy.iastate.edu/policy/trademark/ [https://perma.cc/5RZD-QAT7]. 
28 Iowa State University Trademark Licensing Office, supra note 27. 
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 Promote and protect Iowa State University 
through implementation of a management 
system, which establishes the means for 
consistent, favorable, and professional use of the 
Marks; 
 Fulfill the legal obligation to protect the Marks; 
 Protect the consumer from deception or from 
faulty or inferior products and services bearing 
the university’s Marks; 
 Provide fair and equitable treatment of all 
licensees; and 
 Realize and distribute earned royalties and other 
revenues for the benefit of the university.29 
The Guidelines granted student organizations the privilege of 
using the marks, but insisted that the designs “appropriately 
portray the image of the University” and avoid “the appearance of 
a University endorsement.”30 One of ISU’s federally-registered 
trademarks is its mascot, “Cy,” the feature of the dispute.31 
The Iowa State Chapter of NORML was established as a 
student organization on ISU’s campus in October 2012.32 In an 
effort to attract members and promote the organization, NORML 
promptly submitted a t-shirt design to ISU’s Trademark Office, 
seeking permission to use the Cy trademark in its design.33 The t-
shirts were intended to raise awareness of Iowa marijuana 
legislation on ISU’s campus and promote the student 
organization.34 This first design submitted by NORML had 
“NORML ISU” on the front with the “O” replaced by an image of 
Cy.35 The back of the shirt contained a line that read, “Freedom is 
                                                                                                             
29 Id. 
30 Brief for Appellant at 4, Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich II), 847 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(No. 16–1518) [hereinafter Brief for Appellant]. 
31 Id. at 3. 
32 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701. 
33 Id. at 701–03. 
34 Brief for Appellee at 2–4, Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich II), 847 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 
2017) (No. 16–1518), 2016 WL 2865243 [hereinafter Brief for Appellee]. 
35 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701. 
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NORML at ISU,” accompanied by a small cannabis leaf.36 The 
ISU Trademark Office approved this proposed design for use of 
ISU’s trademark on NORML’s t-shirt order several days later.37 
On November 19, 2012, the Des Moines Register published an 
article discussing the marijuana legalization referenda in Colorado 
and Washington while drawing attention to advocacy efforts by 
organizations like NORML to similarly change Iowa’s marijuana 
laws.38 The article, quoting several members of NORML’s student 
leadership, stated that NORML received “nothing but support from 
the university.”39 The article went on to examine the student 
organization’s efforts on ISU’s campus, and surveyed various 
policy opinions regarding medical marijuana.40 
After the article was published, ISU claimed to receive 
immediate communication from members of the public expressing 
concern that the design suggested that the university endorsed 
NORML’s political and legislative agenda.41 More concerning, the 
university said, was the implication that the student organization 
was advocating drug use.42 The same day that the article ran in the 
Register, ISU received calls from a legislative staffer for the Iowa 
House Republican Caucus, as well as an aide for the Governor’s 
Office for Drug Control Policy, inquiring as to whether ISU’s 
licensing office had approved of and endorsed the use of the 
university’s logo for the NORML ISU t-shirt.43 ISU’s President 
and his staff reportedly spent the rest of the day dealing with the 
“political public relations implications” of the t-shirt design, and 
immediately scheduled a meeting with senior administration 
officials to address the issue.44 
On November 24, 2012, several weeks after the article was 
published, NORML requested approval from the Trademark Office 
                                                                                                             
36 Id. 
37 Id. 
38 Id. 
39 Id. 
40 Id. 
41 Id. at 701–02; Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 3–5. 
42 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701–02; Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 4–5. 
43 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 702–03. 
44 Id. at 702. 
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for the use of the same design submitted in October on another 
order.45 ISU officials in the Trademark Office denied that request 
on December 3, 2012.46 Meeting with the NORML student 
leadership, ISU informed the organization that it would not 
approve any other designs using images of cannabis leaves 
alongside ISU trademarks.47 Officials further instructed NORML 
student leadership that the group was required to obtain the 
approval of ISU administration, including the Senior Vice 
President of the Division of Business & Financial Affairs and 
Senior Vice President for Student Affairs, before submitting any 
future t-shirt designs to the Trademark Office.48 
At the direction of the university president, ISU subsequently 
revised its Trademark Guidelines on January 16, 2013.49 The new 
guidelines prohibited “designs that suggest promotion of the below 
listed items . . . dangerous, illegal or unhealthy products, actions or 
behaviors; . . . [or] drugs and drug paraphernalia that are illegal or 
unhealthful.”50 ISU officials expressly indicated that this revision 
to the Trademark Guidelines “was done as the result of a number 
of external comments including interpretations that the t-shirt 
developed indicated that Iowa State University supported the 
NORMAL ISU advocacy for the reform of marijuana laws.”51 
Accordingly, the Trademark Office continued to reject further 
design requests by NORML that directly referenced “marijuana” in 
picture or text.52 Significantly, however, the ISU Trademark Office 
approved several designs that omitted the picture of a cannabis leaf 
or explicit mention of marijuana but retained the same views and 
agenda of NORML.53 
                                                                                                             
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 703. 
47 Id. at 703–04. 
48 Id. at 705. 
49 Id. at 702–03. 
50 Iowa State University Trademark Licensing Office, Guidelines for University 
Trademark Use by Student and Campus Organizations, IOWA ST. U. (2018), at 6, 
http://www.trademark.iastate.edu/sites/default/files/imported/policy/TM_student.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/F84D-BZAJ]. 
51 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 703 (internal edits omitted). 
52 Id. 
53 Id. 
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NORML filed a lawsuit in Iowa state district court, which ISU 
later removed to the federal district court in the Southern District 
of Iowa.54 The district court granted summary judgment for 
NORML, agreeing with the plaintiffs that the denial of use of ISU 
trademarks, along with the subsequent change in the university’s 
trademark use policy, were “naturally predicated on the political 
content of the group’s views,” constituting impermissible 
viewpoint discrimination against the organization in violation of 
the students’ First Amendment rights.55 
B. Appeal to the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals 
Throughout litigation, ISU advanced two core concerns: (1) the 
consequences of allowing ISU’s trademark to be placed next to an 
image of an illegal drug that is recognized as a symbol for illicit 
drug use and (2) confusion surrounding the public’s perceived 
endorsement of NORML’s political and legislative agenda.56 As 
“inherently expressive devices,” ISU urged the court to consider 
the expressive implications that occur when its trademark is 
associated with message with which it does not agree.57 
By contrast, NORML emphasized that endorsement from the 
university was exactly what it desired—and was entitled to—as a 
recognized student organization on ISU’s campus.58 NORML 
further asserted that ISU discriminated against it because of its 
views on drug policy reform, in clear violation of First 
Amendment case law protecting the students’ right of 
association.59 It is noteworthy to point out that the record reflected 
that students of NORML intended public confusion, and aimed for 
the perception that ISU was endorsing NORML’s message and 
political agenda.60 
                                                                                                             
54 Id. 
55 Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich I), 152 F.Supp.3d 1152, 1172 (S.D. Iowa 2016). 
56 Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 5–6, 30–31, 34, 36–37, 42–43; see generally 
Gerlich III, 861 F.3d 697. 
57 Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 33. 
58 See Brief of Appellee, supra note 34, at 18–21, 31–36. 
59 See id. at 18–21. 
60 Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 9. 
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1.   Iowa State University’s Position and the Interests of Higher 
Education Institutions 
Upon appeal to the Eighth Circuit, ISU’s primary assignment 
of error was, first and foremost, that the district court misidentified 
and mischaracterized the nature of the speech at issue.61 
Specifically, the university argued that ISU, as a long-standing 
institution of higher education, had crafted a very particular 
message and cultivated a distinct public image through the 
selective use of its trademark and emphasized the large role its 
trademarks play in promoting ISU’s institutional image as a 
welcoming campus and serious academic institution.62 ISU further 
impressed the importance of the university to maintain the use of 
its trademark: 
It is undisputed that ISU’s trademarks are means by which the 
University communicates its messages, connects with its 
stakeholders, and promotes its brand. ISU uses its trademarks to 
attract prospective students, private and governmental support, 
new faculty and staff, and to encourage alumni participation and 
support. Through decades of effort and careful management, ISU 
has built public goodwill into its trademarks, and as a result its 
trademarks carry considerable communications and commercial 
value.63 
In other words, in order for a trademark to accurately and 
effectively communicate the university’s message, an institution of 
higher education naturally must exercise “careful management and 
editorial discretion” regarding the messages and images with 
which it is associated.64 
As a result of this particularly-crafted message, ISU asserted 
that such expressive qualities inherent in a federally-registered 
trademark constituted speech of the university itself.65 ISU argued 
                                                                                                             
61 See id. at 33–34. 
62 Id. 
63 Id. at 53 (citing In re Tam, 808 F.3d 1321 (Fed. Cir. 2015), cert. granted, Lee v. 
Tam, 137 S. Ct. 30 (2017)). 
64 Id. at 44. 
65 Id. at 29; see also Reply Brief for Appellant at 3–10, Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich II), 
847 F.3d 1005 (8th Cir. 2017) (No. 16-1518). 
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that the constitutional issue regarding ISU’s trademark-use policy 
for student organizations did not revolve around the viewpoint of 
NORML or the political statements expressed on its t-shirts; rather, 
it contended that ISU’s trademark itself constituted government 
speech by the public university, and as such was beyond the reach 
of First Amendment protections.66 
Broadly speaking, the government speech doctrine recognizes 
that public bodies have expressive interests and produces speech 
that is “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a 
government message.”67 When the government engages in 
expressive activity of its own, as opposed to merely “managing 
government property,” forum analysis is inapplicable because the 
government itself is speaking rather than providing a “forum” 
through which ordinary citizens express themselves.68 The two 
seminal cases defining the Government Speech Doctrine are 
Pleasant Grove City v. Summum69 and Walker v. Texas Division, 
Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc.70 In Pleasant Grove City, the 
Supreme Court held that the First Amendment did not place 
restrictions on the expression undertaken by government entities 
themselves because, under First Amendment precedent, “[a] 
government entity has the right to ‘speak for itself’ and ‘is entitled 
to say what it wishes,’ and to select the views that it wants to 
express.”71 The court reasoned that this same principle applied 
when the government used private speakers to express a 
government-controlled message.72 In Pleasant Grove City, a 
religious organization requested permission from the city to erect a 
stone monument that contained its own religious tenants and place 
it in a park near a similarly-sized monument displaying the Ten 
                                                                                                             
66 Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 30. 
67 Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2250–51 
(2015) (quoting Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 472 (2009)). 
68 Id. 
69 555 U.S. 460 (2009). 
70 135 S. Ct. 2239 (2015). 
71 555 U.S. at 467–68 (quoting Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 
529 U.S. 217, 229 (2010)); Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 
819, 833 (1995); Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 194 (1991)). 
72 Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 468 (citing Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 833). 
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Commandments.73 The city rejected the request,74 and the 
organization sued, alleging the city violated its First Amendment 
rights by discriminating against its viewpoint, since the 
municipality had previously erected a monument to the Christian 
faith but rejected that of “the Seven Aphorisms of Summum.”75 
The Supreme Court concluded the municipality was exercising 
a form of government speech when it allowed the placement of 
permanent monuments in a city park donated to the city.76 Rather 
than opening up the park for private donors to display whatever 
monuments they wished, creating a public forum, the city 
“effectively controlled” the messages expressed by the monuments 
when the municipality gave its “final approval authority” over their 
placement in the park.77 Accordingly, the court rejected the 
plaintiff-religious organization’s argument that the city violated its 
First Amendment rights by discriminating against its expressive 
viewpoint when the city declined to grant the organization 
permission to place its own monument in the park.78 The city’s 
decision, then, was immune from First Amendment scrutiny.79 
Pleasant Grove City ultimately established the principle that the 
only legal restraints on the government’s speech are the 
Establishment Clause and political opposition: “The involvement 
of public officials in advocacy may be limited by law, regulation, 
or practice. And of course, a government entity is ultimately 
‘accountable to the electorate and the political process for  
its advocacy.’”80 
Building off the foundation for the government speech doctrine 
established in Pleasant Grove City, the Walker court held that 
                                                                                                             
73 Id. at 465. 
74 The city explained to the religious organization that its practice was to limit 
monuments in the park to those donated to the city that “either (1) directly relate to the 
history of Pleasant Grove, or (2) were donated by groups with longstanding ties to the 
Pleasant Grove community,” citing safety and aesthetics considerations. Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. at 472. 
77 Id. at 470–72. 
78 Id. 
79 Id. 
80 Id. (citing Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 
(2010)). 
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state-issued, personalized license plates expressed the endorsement 
and viewpoint of the government, and were similarly exempt from 
First Amendment regulation.81 There, the “Sons of Confederate 
Veterans” organization sought to sponsor a specialty license plate 
through the State of Texas’ personalized vanity plate program.82 
Texas rejected an application for a design featuring the 
Confederate battle flag after public comments reflected a large 
segment of the population considered the design to be offensive.83 
Just like the municipality’s activity with monuments in the park in 
Pleasant Grove City, the Supreme Court held the State of Texas 
was engaged in its own expressive conduct rather than “simply 
managing government property” because the specialty license 
plates were “meant to convey and have the effect of conveying a 
government message.”84 Relying on the rationale provided in 
Pleasant Grove City, the court concluded that the First 
Amendment’s application to the government’ expressive activities 
in managing a state-sponsored license plate program intended to 
convey only its own message, not those of other individuals.85 
Thus, the only recourse private individuals can seek against 
                                                                                                             
81 Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2248 
(2015). The court articulated a three-part test for government speech: whether (1) the 
government has a history of using the medium to express its viewpoint to the public; (2) 
the medium is often “closely identified in the public mind” with the government; and (3) 
the government maintains direct control over the messages conveyed through the 
medium. Id. at 2248–49 (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 470–71, 473). 
82 Id. at 2244–45. 
83 Id. at 2245. 
84 Id. at 2251 (citing Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. at 472). 
85 “We have acknowledged that drivers who display a State’s selected license plate 
designs convey the messages communicated through those designs. And we have 
recognized that the First Amendment stringently limits a State’s authority to compel a 
private party to express a view with which the private party disagrees. But here, 
compelled private speech is not at issue. And just as Texas cannot require [a private 
organization] to convey “the State’s ideological message,” [that organization] cannot 
force Texas to include a Confederate battle flag on its specialty license plates.” Id. at 
2253 (citing Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705, 715–717, n.15, 97 S. Ct. 1428 (1977); 
Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group of Boston, 515 U.S. 557, 
573, 115 S. Ct. 2338 (1995); West Virginia Bd. of Ed. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 
(1943)). 
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unpopular speech advanced by the government lies in the political 
realm.86 
Citing Pleasant Grove City and Walker, ISU argued to the 
Eighth Circuit that the district court erred in holding that a 
university trademark could only constitute government speech to 
the extent it conveyed the actual and intentional endorsement of 
the university.87 Rather, ISU urged the court to consider the 
contrapositive: that government speech also includes choosing not 
to speak.88 It would follow, urged ISU, that if universities possess a 
right to associate themselves with particular messages, they also 
possess a parallel right to disassociate themselves from other 
messages.89 Indeed, the Walker Court held that a personalized 
license plate promoting the Confederacy, issued by the State of 
Texas, expressed an implicit message of state endorsement,90 and 
numerous other federal circuit courts have applied the government 
speech doctrine to instances of government property that are 
arguably far less expressive than a registered trademark.91 Why, 
                                                                                                             
86 “The Free Speech Clause helps produce informed opinions among members of the 
public, who are then able to influence the choices of a government that, through words 
and deeds, will reflect its electoral mandate.” Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2246. Indeed, “[t]hat 
freedom in part reflects the fact that it is the democratic electoral process that first and 
foremost provides a check on government speech.” Id. at 2245 (citing Pleasant Grove 
City v. Summum, 555 U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009), and Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys. 
v. Southworth, 529 U.S. 217, 235 (2010). 
87 Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 34–35. 
88 Id. at 37–38. 
89 Id. at 34–35. Indeed, “[s]ince all speech inherently involves choices of what to say 
and what to leave unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is 
that one who chooses to speak may also decide what not to say.” Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573 
(quoting Pacific Gas & Electric Co. v. Public Utilities Comm’n of Cal., 475 U.S. 1, 11 
(1986)). 
90 Hurley, 515 U.S. at 573; Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2249. 
91 See generally Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(involving advertisement banners placed on the outfield fence of a school baseball 
diamond); Sutliffe v. Epping Sch. Dist., 584 F.3d 314 (1st Cir. 2009) (discussing 
approval of budgets for newsletters, mailings, and other mediums of communication like 
a website); Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist. One, 531 F.3d 275 (4th Cir. 2008) 
(regarding a school district website); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606 (5th Cir. 2005) 
(involving the state selection of environmental science textbooks); Downs v. Los Angeles 
Unified Sch. Dist., 228 F.3d 1003 (9th Cir. 2000) (regarding a high school bulletin 
board); Edwards v. Cal. Univ. of Penn., 156 F.3d 488 (3rd Cir. 1998) (contemplating 
university curriculum and classroom materials); Knights of Ku Klux Klan v. Curators of 
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then, couldn’t a trademarked-mascot not express the implicit 
message of official endorsement of the State of Iowa? 
2.  NORML’s Position and the Interests of University Students 
The issue remains that explicitly withholding endorsement of a 
student organization’s expressive activities denies a student 
organization the sense of legitimacy and credibility derived from 
its association with an institution of higher education.92 NORML 
conceded that ISU had a right to approve or disapprove the use of 
its trademark by student organizations on its campus.93 However, 
the group argued that the university could not operate its 
Trademark Office so as to explicitly discriminate against one 
group on the basis of its political viewpoint and the particular 
message it expressed.94 NORML alleged that ISU manipulated its 
trademark licensing program specifically to control the expressive 
activities of the student organization because it received political 
pushback regarding the group’s legislative agenda.95 To the 
contrary of ISU’s suggestion, NORML asserted the historical use 
of university trademarks by a wide array of politically and 
intellectually opposed speakers on campus, along with “the 
university’s traditional station in American society . . . reflects [a 
university’s] rightful commitment to fostering diverse forms of 
civic engagement and intellectual exploration and debate.”96 
Indeed, ISU did not purport to endorse—and in fact explicitly 
                                                                                                             
Univ. of Mo., 203 F.3d 1085 (8th Cir. 2000) (discussing underwriting acknowledgements 
by public university radio station. 
92 See Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181 (1972) (“There can be no doubt that denial of 
official recognition, without justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges 
that [First Amendment] associational right.”). 
93 See Brief for Appellee, supra note 34, at 37 (“Defendants claim this is too general a 
statement and try to reframe the issue as being whether Plaintiffs have a ‘right to use ISU 
marks without limitation.’ But Plaintiffs have never claimed such a ‘right’ and there is no 
issue of removing ‘all limitations’ in this case. Rather, this is about Gerlich and 
Furleigh’s right to engage in protected speech without suffering discriminatory treatment 
or retribution from ISU officials who are trying to curry political favor or avoid a 
political backlash. That well-established right is beyond question.” (internal citations 
omitted)). 
94 See id. at 17–20. 
95 See id. at 12–13. 
96 Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich I), 152 F. Supp. 3d 1152, 1175–76 (S. D. Iowa 2016). 
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disclaimed any intent to endorse—NORML’s political agenda; nor 
did it express approval of the political message of any other 
student organization when authorizing the organization to use its 
registered trademark.97 By contrast, denying the use of a 
university-owned trademark to one of its student organizations on 
the basis of its politically-charged message in a viewpoint-
discriminatory way seems fundamentally incompatible with the 
role of a university in fostering civic discourse; thus violating the 
students’ right to freedom of expression.98 
NORML relied on key cases prohibiting viewpoint 
discrimination by a university against its student in exercising their 
First Amendment free speech and associational rights on university 
campuses.99 In Healy v. James,100 for instance, the Supreme Court 
found that the university had violated its students’ First 
Amendment right to free speech and association by refusing to 
grant official recognition to a student organization advocating for 
far “left-wing” political views.101 The Healy court concluded 
“[t]here can be no doubt that denial of official recognition, without 
justification, to college organizations burdens or abridges that 
associational right” implicit in the freedoms of speech, assembly, 
and petition of the First Amendment.102 
                                                                                                             
97 Id. at 1158 (“The Trademark Office licenses ISU marks to recognized student 
organizations that espouse controversial ideas, activities, or lifestyle choices without the 
assumption that the University supports or endorses any of those ideas, activities, or 
lifestyle choices. Defendants acknowledge that licensing a trademark to a student group 
does not mean that ISU takes a position on what the group represents.”). 
98 “Appellants not only want an exception that swallows the rule – they want rules to 
be obliterated where there are possible exceptions.” Brief for Appellee, supra note 34, at 
39. 
99 See generally id. at 1 (relying on apposite cases Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 
(1972), Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995), and Gay 
& Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 1988)). 
100 408 U.S. 169 (1972). 
101 Id. at 187–88, 192–93 (“The College, acting here as the instrumentality of the State, 
may not restrict speech or association simply because it finds the views expressed by any 
group to be abhorrent.”). 
102 Id. at 181. The Supreme Court continued: “[The students’] associational interests 
also were circumscribed by the denial of the use of campus bulletin boards and the school 
newspaper. If an organization is to remain a viable entity in a campus community in 
which new students enter on a regular basis, it must possess the means of communicating 
with these students. Moreover, the organization’s ability to participate in the intellectual 
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Consistent with the reasoning in Healy, the Supreme Court in 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the University of Virginia 
affirmed the principle that universities serve as a model for 
fundamental free speech rights, and cannot discriminate against 
their students’ expression on the basis of the students’ 
viewpoint.103 The Court held in Rosenberger that the university 
similarly violated the free speech rights of its students by denying 
the funding request of a Christian student newspaper.104 In making 
its funding generally available to student organizations, the Court 
reasoned that the university had created a limited public forum for 
private speech.105 Even though Rosenberger involved the 
allocation of university funding, rather than physical meeting space 
provided to student groups and community organizations,106 the 
Court found the forums analogous and applied the same 
requirement of viewpoint-neutrality.107 Accordingly, the Court did 
not allow the university in Rosenberger to favor one speaker over 
another, based on content, regarding a “space” it had opened up to 
use by its students.108 The Court found that such viewpoint-based 
discrimination violated the First Amendment rights of the 
students.109 
                                                                                                             
give and take of campus debate, and to pursue its stated purposes, is limited by denial of 
access to the customary media for communicating with the administration, faculty 
members, and other students. Such impediments cannot be viewed as insubstantial.” Id. at 
181–82. 
103 515 U.S. 819, 845 (1995). 
104 Id. at 845–46. 
105 Id. at 829 (citing Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 508 U.S. 
384, 390 (1993)). 
106 Cf. Lamb’s Chapel, 508 U.S. at 395 (holding the denial of a church access to school 
premises after-hours to exhibit a film series violated the First Amendment free speech 
clause). 
107 Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830 (“The [Student Activities Fund] is a forum more in a 
metaphysical than in a spatial or geographic sense, but the same principles are 
applicable.”). 
108 Id. at 895–96 (declining to differentiate between physical and intangible “meeting 
space” for purposes of expressive activity protected by the First Amendment). 
109 Id.; see also id. at 833–34 (“When the government disburses public funds to private 
entities to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps 
to ensure that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. It does not 
follow, however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based restrictions are 
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it 
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Consistent with this line of cases, NORML argued that the 
question of viewpoint discrimination by universities had been tried 
and settled.110 From a student’s perspective, favoring certain 
student organizations over others based on the content of their 
message is contrary to a university’s central, historical purpose of 
fostering an environment of intellectual maturation and civic 
dialogue among its students.111 Ultimately, NORML urged that 
universities cannot be allowed to circumvent the prohibitions of 
viewpoint discrimination simply because the space they make 
available to their students does not resemble traditional, physical 
forums of speech.112 
3.  The Gerlich Decision 
The Gerlich ruling was praised by advocates of individual 
liberties and students rights groups,113 but also created an anxious 
tension with officials and administrators in higher education.114 
Affirming the district court’s decision in full, the Court of Appeals 
                                                                                                             
favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private 
speakers.”) (citing Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)). The Eighth Circuit applied this 
same principle nearly a decade prior to Rosenberger, holding that a public university 
could not siphon off funding from a student organization promoting gay rights and 
gender equality, simply because the university did not agree with the group’s political 
message. See generally Gay & Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361 (8th Cir. 
1988). Similar to Rosenberger, in Gohn the university had made funding generally 
available to student groups but denied funding to one advocating for gay rights because it 
disagreed with its view on that issue. Id. at 362–65, 367. The university’s denial of 
funding violated that student organization’s First Amendment rights because the 
university deviated from established funding procedure specifically because of the 
group’s viewpoint on gay rights. Id. at 367. 
110 See Brief for Appellee supra note 34, at 13–14 (arguing that “Few First Amendment 
principles are more clearly established than the prohibition on viewpoint discrimination, 
which the Supreme Court has described as “an egregious form of content discrimination.” 
(quoting Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 828–29)). 
111 Brief for Appellee, supra note 34, at 14–15. 
112 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830. 
113 Marieke Tuthill Beck-Coon, Eighth Circuit reaffirms victory at Iowa State: School 
still can’t censor pot legalization T-shirts, FOUND. FOR INDIVIDUAL RTS. IN EDUC. (FIRE) 
(June 14, 2017), https://www.thefire.org/eighth-circuit-reaffirms-victory-at-iowa-state-
school-still-cant-censor-pot-legalization-t-shirts/ [https://perma.cc/UT9V-NWNC]. 
114 See generally Six Top Tips for Your Internal Trademark Licensing Policies, HIGHER 
EDUC. LEGAL INSIGHTS (July 27, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library/
detail.aspx?g=dee82d16-d7a1-43ed-8a4d-289415937c47 [https://perma.cc/3CEN-H5V8]. 
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for the Eighth Circuit embraced the arguments advanced by 
NORML wholeheartedly.115 
The federal circuit court disagreed with ISU’s contention that 
the university’s trademark licensing regime constituted 
government speech for two reasons. First, the court concluded that, 
consistent with Rosenberger, the university had “created a limited 
public forum” in its administration of its trademark licensing 
regime by making “its trademarks available for student 
organizations if they abided by certain conditions.”116 
The court reasoned that even if the regulation of the use of 
ISU’s trademark by student organizations did not actually establish 
a limited public forum, ISU did not use its trademark licensing 
regime to express itself or communicate any message, and thus 
ISU’s trademark could not constitute government speech.117 Under 
Walker, the court determined that ISU had not historically used its 
trademarks as a medium for its own speech because the university 
allowed nearly 800 student organizations to use its trademarks 
each year and the record reflected that ISU officials repeatedly 
asserted that the university did not intend to communicate any 
message to the public through the trademark’s use by student 
groups.118 In any event, concluded the Eighth Circuit, the 
government speech doctrine could not apply to ISU’s trademark 
since it had already established that licensing student organizations 
to use university trademarks creates a limited public forum.119 The 
Gerlich court uniformly rejected the argument that, through 
NORML’s use of ISU’s trademark, the university was engaging in 
                                                                                                             
115 Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 705–10. 
116 Id. at 705 (“A university ‘establish[es] limited public forums by opening property 
limited to use by certain groups or dedicated solely to the discussion of certain 
subjects.’”) (quoting Christian Legal Soc’y Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the 
Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 679 n.11 (2010)). 
117 Id. at 707–08. 
118 Id. (citing Walker v. Texas Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 
2239, 2248 (2015)). 
119 Id. at 707. This sort of circular reasoning commonly occurs throughout the Gerlich 
decision, and helps demonstrate how the Eighth Circuit over-simplified the underlying 
Free Speech issue. 
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expressive activity through its association with and implied 
endorsement of the student group’s message.120 
The Eighth Circuit concluded by reprimanding the university’s 
senior leadership for their actions against the students of NORML, 
stating that “[t]he record is also replete with statements from 
defendants regarding their political motives.”121 In fact, the court 
publicly condemned ISU officials for undermining the institution’s 
core function—preparing students for civic engagement and 
democratic participation as citizens—when it implied that the 
students of NORML were not contributing to the free exchange of 
dialogue on campus by advocating for legislative change in Iowa 
marijuana laws.122 As such, the court found that this publicity and 
political attention ISU’s trademark received when associated with 
NORML’s t-shirt design played a direct and controlling role in its 
decision to censor the student group’s use of its trademark moving 
forward, constituting impermissible viewpoint discrimination in 
violation of the First Amendment Free Speech Clause.123 
In a concurring opinion upon rehearing by the panel, Judge 
Jane Kelly articulated a more pointed rebuke to the arguments 
offered by ISU. “In at least four cases the Supreme Court has held 
that a university creates a limited public forum when it distributes 
benefits to recognized student groups . . . . These factually 
analogous precedents are no less apposite simply because the court 
cites no case addressing a trademark licensing program.”124 Judge 
Kelly convincingly points out that ISU’s purported reason for 
denying NORML the trademark use does not stand up to close 
                                                                                                             
120 Id. at 706; see also id. at 712–15 (Kelly, J., concurring). 
121 Id. at 706. 
122 “Hill stated in an interview with the Ames Tribune that the reason student groups 
associated with political parties could use ISU’s logos, but groups like NORML ISU may 
not, is because ‘[w]e encourage students to be involved in their duties as a citizen.’ Such 
a statement implies that Hill believed that the members of NORML ISU were not 
undertaking their duties as citizens by advocating for a change in the law.” Id. 
123 Id. at 708–10. 
124 Id. at 710–11 (citing Christian Legal Soc. Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of 
the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 1, 679, 685(2010)); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of 
the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 841 (1995); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 
(1981)); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972); Gay and Lesbian Students Ass’n 
v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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scrutiny.125 If ISU’s rationale holds true, ISU presumably would 
have rejected the t-shirt design the first time, when it was initially 
proposed.126 Indeed, “[p]articipants in a [limited public] forum, 
declared open to speech ex ante, may not be censored ex post when 
the sponsor decides that particular speech is unwelcome.”127 
Ultimately, the court held university officials certainly would 
have—or should have—known that denying access to a channel of 
speech after receiving negative reviews based on the message 
conveyed would not be a permissible exercise of viewpoint 
discrimination, even if such concerns were legitimate.128 
II. THE “MIXED-SPEECH” DILEMMA IN STUDENT EXPRESSION ON 
COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
Issues that accompany student speech occurring on the 
campuses of higher education institutions are incredibly 
complicated. Despite the ease by which the Gerlich Court reached 
its conclusion, the surrounding case law is far from being “clearly 
established.” In truth, such speech often implicates First 
Amendment interests of multiple parties on campus and can be 
best understood as “mixed speech”—speech that bears expressive 
qualities and consequential interests of both students and the 
university.129 The Supreme Court itself has acknowledged that the 
development of its First Amendment jurisprudence in recent years 
has left the doctrinal framework uncertain and nearly 
unnavigable.130 In fact, Chief Justice Roberts sarcastically 
remarked during the oral argument of a recent school speech case, 
                                                                                                             
125 See generally infra Part III and accompanying discussion. 
126 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 714 (Kelly, J., concurring). 
127 Id. at 715 (Kelly, J., concurring) (quoting Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731, 737 (7th 
Cir. 2005)) (emphasis added). 
128 Id. at 709; id. at 714–15 (Kelly, J., concurring). See also Cornelius v. NAACP, 473 
U.S. 788, 811 (1985) (“The existence of reasonable grounds for limiting access to a 
nonpublic forum . . . will not save a regulation that is in reality a façade for viewpoint-
based discrimination.”). 
129 Kristi L. Bowman, The Government Speech Doctrine and Speech in Schools, 48 
WAKE FOREST L. REV. 211, 234 (2013). 
130 See id. at 214–15 n.19. 
2018] UNIVERSITY TRADEMARKS AND "MIXED SPEECH" 801 
 
Morse v. Frederick,131 how complex even the preliminary question 
of determining the speaker and analyzing the expression, let alone 
characterizing the forum itself, can be.132 
Evaluating a free speech claim against a university presents a 
number of issues complicating traditional First Amendment forum 
analysis. Determining the “speaker,” first and foremost, presents 
the greatest challenge. But even with this hurdle cleared, deciding 
in what context, or forum, to analyze the speech at issue is 
similarly unclear. Finally, considering the university’s interest in 
the speech, as it relates to the institution’s mission and reputation, 
confronts the question of how the university’s imprimatur is 
implicated and whether or not this matters constitutionally. Taken 
together, it becomes less clear who the “speaker” is in mixed-
speech cases for purposes of adjudicating First Amendment 
                                                                                                             
131 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
132 “CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: You think the law was clearly established when this 
happened that the principal, that the instant that the banner was unfurled, snowballs are 
flying around, the torch is coming, should have said oh, I remember under Tinker I can 
only take the sign down if it’s disruptive. But then under Fraser I can do something if it 
interferes with the basic mission, and under Kuhlmeier I’ve got this other thing. So she 
should have known at that point that she could not take the banner down, and it was so 
clear that she should have to pay out of her own pocket because of it. 
MR. MERTZ [counsel for Frederick]: Mr. Chief Justice, there are two different time 
points we have to talk about. There’s the heat of the moment out there on the street, but 
then later back in the office when she actually decided to levy the punishment after she 
had talked to him, after she heard why he did it and why he didn’t do it, after she had had 
a chance to consult with the school district’s counsel. At that point in the calmness of her 
office, then she should indeed have known it. And she did testify that she had taken a 
master’s degree course in school law in which she studied Kuhlmeier and Fraser and 
Tinker. So — 
CHIEF JUSTICE ROBERTS: And so it should be perfectly clear to her exactly what she 
could and couldn’t do. 
MR. MERTZ: Yes. 
JUSTICE SCALIA: As it is to us, right? (Laughter.) 
JUSTICE SOUTER: I mean, we have a debate here for going on 50 minutes about what 
Tinker means, about the proper characterization of the behavior, the nonspeech behavior. 
The school’s terms in dealing with the kids that morning. The meaning of that 
statement. We’ve been debating this in this courtroom for going on an hour, and it seems 
to me however you come out, there is reasonable debate. Should the teacher have known, 
even in the, in the calm deliberative atmosphere of the school later, what the correct 
answer is?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 48–50, Morse v. Frederick, 127 S. Ct. 2618 
(2007) (No. 06-278), http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_ 
arguments/argument_transcripts/06-278.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J4Q-467C]. 
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disputes between universities and their students, and whose 
interests should prevail. The following Parts will address each of 
these issues, respectively. 
A. Who is the Speaker? 
Though it may seem straightforward on its face, determining 
who actually owns the speech at issue arguably presents more 
problems than it solves.133 In fact, the Supreme Court predicted in 
the Pleasant Grove City case that “[t]here may be situations in 
which it is difficult to tell whether a government entity is speaking 
on its own behalf or is providing a forum for private speech.”134  
Public schools and universities, like private entities, are capable of 
expression in non-traditional ways that a court should take into 
account when analyzing a claim under the Free Speech Clause. 
The government can speak in a variety of ways. In general, the 
Supreme Court has held that a government entity is capable of 
speaking itself, or when adopting the view of a particular private 
speaker as its own.135 Furthermore, public universities may 
“speak” through the association or promotion of “private 
mouthpieces” even when they do not agree with or purport to 
endorse that speaker’s viewpoint.136 A university promoting or 
associating with a multitude of private speakers, expressing an 
array of individual viewpoints, may constitute the university’s 
expression in a way that represents a broad, multi-faceted 
                                                                                                             
133 See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 751 (“In the public school context, distinguishing 
government speech decisions (which are not reviewed under the Free Speech Clause) 
from student speech restrictions in school-sponsored activities (which are reviewed under 
Hazelwood) may seem to be a deceptively straightforward task. The key question would 
be who is doing the talking.”). 
134 Pleasant Grove City v. Summun, 555 U.S. 460, 470 (2009). 
135 See generally id.; Walker v. Tex. Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. 
Ct. 2239 (2015); Pleasant Grove City, 555 U.S. 460. 
136 See Joseph Blocher, School Naming Rights and the First Amendment’s Perfect 
Storm, 96 GEO. LJ. 1, 55–56 (2007); see, e.g., Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 
523 U.S. 666 (1998); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts v. Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 572 (1998); 
see generally Mary Jean Dolan, The Special Public Purpose Forum and Endorsement 
Relationships: New Extensions of Government Speech, 31 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 71 
(2004). 
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“viewpoint.”137 State actors at large also engage in their own 
speech activity where they exercise editorial discretion in selecting 
the expressive material of third parties—“editorial choices” by 
public entities are, according to the Supreme Court, 
communicative acts.138 
For example, one federal appellate court applied Walker and 
Pleasant Grove City to find that billboards erected around the 
outfield of a public high school’s baseball field constituted 
government speech because the banners bore the imprimatur of the 
school, and the school exercised “substantial control” over the 
messages conveyed by the banners, effectively reserving the right 
to speak for itself through individual private actors.139 
Consequently, the court held the First Amendment allowed the 
                                                                                                             
137 See Blocher, supra note 136. But see Randall P. Bezanson, The Government Speech 
Forum: Forbes and Finley and Government Speech Selection Judgments, 83 IOWA L. 
REV. 953, 993–94 (1998) (“Not only must government’s claimed relationship to a 
controllable speaker be a legitimate one grounded in government’s interest in the speech 
activity itself (rather than welfare payments or construction contracts), but the speech 
restrictions must also be voluntary and related to government’s valid expressive purposes 
(as employer, policymaker, subsidizer, purchaser, patron). Moreover, government’s 
expressive purpose must be explicitly stated, the conditions placed on speakers must be 
narrowly adapted to communicating the intended message, and government’s expression 
must be additive and participatory, not exclusive and monopolistic.”). 
138 Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n, 523 U.S. at 679 (“On the other hand, the government 
does not create a designated public forum when it does no more than reserve eligibility 
for access to the forum to a particular class of speakers, whose members must then, as 
individuals, ‘obtain permission.’”); Nat’l Endowment for the Arts, 524 U.S. at 587–88 
(noting that government entities have “wide latitude to set spending priorities” and 
“allocate competitive funding according to criteria that would be impermissible were 
direct regulation of speech or criminal penalty at stake” without violating the First 
Amendment; but acknowledging “a more pressing constitutional question would arise if 
Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated to 
drive certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.”). The Forbes Court 
distinguished an instance where the public television station, controlled by the state, 
chose to invite certain political candidates to a televised debate from the instance in 
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), where a public university made university 
facilities generally available to student organizations but denied access to a group seeking 
to use them for religious worship in violation of the First Amendment as a content-based 
discrimination. 
139 See Mech v. Sch. Bd. of Palm Beach Cty., 806 F.3d 1070, 1074 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(“When the government exercises the right to speak for itself, it can freely select the 
views that it wants to express. This freedom includes choosing not to speak and speaking 
through the . . . removal of speech that the government disapproves.”). 
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school to remove the advertisement of a math tutor who doubled as 
an adult film actor.140 Instances of curricular speech, expressed by 
students themselves, can also constitute speech by the 
university.141 Under the current Free Speech jurisprudence 
analyzing editorial choices in a teacher’s curriculum,142 
government speech could conceivably encompass instances where 
a teacher assigns a student to read his or her history report to the 
rest of the class, or where school rules state that funding for a 
student newspaper may be used to express only the messages that 
the university wants to communicate.143 
However, as the Gerlich court points out, these instances of a 
university speaking itself, or speaking through private actors, are 
distinguishable from a university merely facilitating the speech of 
private parties.144 In this latter category, universities may not 
discriminate based on viewpoint because the speech is associated 
more with the individual student than it is with the university.145 
When facilitating the association and expression of student 
organizations through official recognition or budgetary allocations, 
universities may not deny expressive opportunity on the basis of a 
particular group’s viewpoint, message, or political ideology.146 
                                                                                                             
140 See id. (“Because characterizing speech as government speech ‘strips it of all First 
Amendment protection’ under the Free Speech Clause, we do not do so lightly.”) 
(quoting Walker v. Tex Div., Sons of Confederate Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2255 
(2015)) (Alito, J., dissenting). 
141 See also Brownstein, supra note 6, at 736–37, 750, 769 (“By analogy, student 
speech that is part of a curricular activity may also constitute government speech.”). 
142 See, e.g., Mayer v. Monroe Cty. Cmty. Sch. Corp., 474 F.3d 477, 479 (7th Cir. 
2007); Chiras v. Miller, 432 F.3d 606, 614 (5th Cir. 2005); Downs v. L.A. Unified Sch. 
Dist., 228 F.3d 1003, 1015–16 (9th Cir. 2000); see also Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n, 
523 U.S. at 674 (reasoning in dicta that “public school prescribing its curriculum” is not 
subject to the restraints of the Free Speech Clause). 
143 Brownstein, supra note 6, at 736. 
144 See Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 709 (8th Cir. 2017). 
145 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995) 
(citing Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990); 
Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–72 (1988)). 
146 See id. at 833–34 (“When the government disburses public funds to private entities 
to convey a governmental message, it may take legitimate and appropriate steps to ensure 
that its message is neither garbled nor distorted by the grantee. It does not follow, 
however, and we did not suggest in Widmar, that viewpoint-based restrictions are proper 
when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a message it favors 
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Indeed, the Supreme Court’s decision in Widmar v. Vincent147 
explicitly forbids viewpoint discrimination in university 
accommodations of expression.148 The Widmar Court held that 
where a public university makes its campus facilities generally 
available to student groups for expressive purposes, it may not 
deny access based on the group’s content or viewpoint.149 
While many courts determine whether a particular instance 
constitutes university or student speech on an ad hoc basis,150 only 
rarely do they more thoroughly examine the nature of the particular 
expression at issue.151 The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals decision 
in Fleming v. Jefferson County School District R-1152 is one 
occasion of a school-related speech dispute where a court took 
advantage of the opportunity to do so. That case involved an art 
initiative at a public elementary school, inviting students, parents, 
and community members to paint tiles that would be placed around 
the campus.153 The tiles had to conform to certain guidelines and 
                                                                                                             
but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from private speakers. A 
holding that the University may not discriminate based on the viewpoint of private 
persons whose speech it facilitates does not restrict the University’s own speech, which is 
controlled by different principles.”) (internal citations omitted); Gay & Lesbian Students 
Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1988). See also Nat’l Endowment for Arts v. 
Finley, 524 U.S. 569, 587 (1998) (“[A] more pressing constitutional question would arise 
if Government funding resulted in the imposition of a disproportionate burden calculated 
to drive ‘certain ideas or viewpoints from the marketplace.’”) (quoting Simon & 
Schuster, Inc. v. Members of N.Y. State Crime Victims Bd., 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991)). 
147 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981). 
148 Id. (“[W]e affirm the continuing validity of cases, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. at 
188–89, that recognize a University’s right to exclude even First Amendment activities 
that violate reasonable campus rules or substantially interfere with the opportunity of 
other students to obtain an education.”). 
149 Id. (“Having created a forum generally open to student groups, the University seeks 
to enforce a content-based exclusion of religious speech. Its exclusionary policy violates 
the fundamental principle that a state regulation of speech should be content-neutral, and 
the University is unable to justify this violation under applicable constitutional 
standards.”). 
150 Brownstein, supra note 6, at 750. 
151 Id. at 757–58 (noting the different approaches taken by courts to resolve speech-
related issues in public schools, but ultimately concluding that the case law reflects “a 
muddled lack of clarity about the relationship between these overlapping frameworks”). 
152 298 F.3d 918, 923 (10th Cir. 2002). 
153 Id. at 920–22. 
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were subject to the approval of the school administration.154 The 
Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals fashioned its own analysis to 
determine the nature of the speech, asking: (1) whether the central 
purpose was to promote views of the school or private speaker; (2) 
whether the school exercised editorial control over the speech 
content; (3) whether the school was the literal speaker; and (4) 
whether ultimate responsibility for the speech rested with the 
school.155 Based on these factors, the Tenth Circuit ultimately 
concluded that the tiles did not represent school speech, but instead 
were school-sponsored speech upon which the school could 
properly place viewpoint-oriented restrictions when related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns.156 Such a searching inquiry, 
however, is rare. 
Courts, along with most scholars, are loath to attribute speech 
to a university.157 This hesitancy is with good reason. By 
classifying the expression as pure “government speech,” the 
expression is essentially exempted from First Amendment 
scrutiny.158 Doing so removes any First Amendment protections 
from students implicated with the speech and negates their 
                                                                                                             
154 Id. at 920. 
155 Id. at 923. 
156 Id. at 924 (citing Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 272 (1988)). 
157 See, e.g., Corbin, supra note 17, at 662–671 (noting that classifying instances of 
competing “mixed speech” between student and university interests “lessens the 
likelihood that the government will be held accountable for its advocacy” and “distorts 
the marketplace of ideas by making some viewpoints seem more popular than they 
actually are”); Bowman, supra note 129, at 283 (arguing that in all instances except 
teachers’ instructional classroom speech, “the government speech doctrine either is not a 
fit at a fundamental level, or it undermines one or both of the public goods so 
substantially that applying it to that category of cases is indefensible”). Other scholars 
embrace the government speech doctrine, but, recognizing its implications, propose more 
stringent requirements on its application. See Joseph Blocher, Viewpoint Neutrality and 
Government Speech, 52 B.C. L. REV. 695, 698, 706–19 (2011) (advocating for the 
application of the government speech doctrine “when the government establishes itself as 
the source of the contested speech both formally and functionally – i.e., where the 
government claims the speech as its own when it authorizes the express, and where 
onlookers understand that expression to be the government’s at the time of its delivery”). 
158 See infra Part IV.2 (examining the viability of the government speech doctrine in 
university free speech cases); See also Walker v. Tex Div., Sons of Confederate 
Veterans, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 2239, 2246–48 (2015); Pleasant Grove City v. Summum, 555 
U.S. 460, 467–68 (2009). 
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interests entirely.159 Such a result is problematic because in an 
instant the students’ interest in the speech is all but obliterated, 
giving the university carte blanche authority to censor speech 
occurring on its campus based on whatever interest it has at 
stake.160 
In fact, attempting to determine whether the speech belongs 
exclusively to the university or its students is, in large part, a false 
choice. Viewing speech in this binary is of little use in instances, 
such as Gerlich, where both parties seem to be speaking (or at least 
have independent interests in expression’s content) 
simultaneously.161 Indeed, it is convenient—and more 
appropriate—to imagine “mixed speech” in the higher education 
setting as existing on a continuum: pure university speech and its 
interest in protecting its imprimatur on one hand and speech 
attributable solely to students and student organizations on  
the other.162 
                                                                                                             
159 See Randall Bezanson & William Buss, The Many Faces of Government Speech,  86 
IOWA L. REV. 1377, 1429 (2001) (“Government speech cannot logically be made a 
function of the office of the person making an allocation decision. That approach would 
elevate form over substance and would enable the government to dictate the First 
Amendment result simply by manipulating the agency in the decision-making process.”). 
160 See Walker, 135 S. Ct. at 2255 (Alito, J., dissenting) (“Unfortunately, the Court’s 
decision categorizes private speech as government speech and thus strips it of all First 
Amendment protection.”). 
161 See Lyrissa Lidski, Public Forum 2.0, 91 B.U. L. REV. 1975, 2011–12 (2011); 
Bowman, supra note 129, at 234–35 & nn.124–27. 
162 Caroline Mala Corbin, Mixed Speech: When Speech Is Both Private and 
Governmental, 83 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 605, 607 (2008) (“The trouble with this dichotomy is 
that not all speech is purely private or purely governmental. In fact, much speech is the 
joint production of both government and private speakers and exists somewhere along a 
continuum, with pure private speech and pure government speech at each end.”); Leslie 
Gielow Jacobs, The Public Sensibilities Forum, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1357, 1358–59 (2001) 
(“Between the extremes of private speech and government speech lies the vast middle 
ground of government/private speech interaction,” describing subsidies of private speech 
of private actors); Helen Norton, Not for Attribution: Government’s Interest in Protecting 
the Integrity of Its Own Expression, 37 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1317, 1319–20 (2004) (“But 
sometimes speech may most accurately be described as simultaneously belonging both to 
government and to private individuals or groups. This is often the case when a public 
actor offers private speakers an expressive opportunity that is especially attractive 
because it appears to carry some indication of government endorsement or imprimatur. 
Recognizing that public and private entities sometimes speak jointly may help us sort 
through some of these hard cases.”). 
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Yet Courts have consistently (and, quite easily) dismissed 
universities’ interests in its students’ speech by relying on such a 
university-student binary, viewing the case as a purely government 
speech case or a purely private speech case.163 Further, they 
routinely fail to consider the possibility that universities may have 
an interest in the expression.164 Instances of co-existent interests in 
the content of expressive activity, like Gerlich, likely fall 
somewhere in the middle between the two ends of the spectrum. 
Though some commentators have gone so far as to consider an 
entirely new speech category,165 few have actually engaged in this 
sort of inquiry, and most continue to rely on this public-private 
binary.166 As aptly put by one scholar, 
[I]f mixed speech is categorized as private speech, the 
government cannot discriminate against any viewpoints. 
Consequently, discounting the government component of mixed 
speech may lead to government endorsement of undesirable 
messages (like offensive or hate speech) or government 
endorsement of religious messages in violation of the 
establishment clause . . . . [I]f mixed speech is categorized as 
government speech, the government may censor viewpoints. 
Viewpoint discrimination, however, may undermine the free 
speech interests of both speakers and audiences and distort the 
marketplace of ideas. Furthermore . . . the government’s chosen 
viewpoint could be mistaken for private preferences. The resulting 
                                                                                                             
163 Bowman, supra note 129, at 278; See also id. at 280 & n.371 (“Even what is the 
closest call [on the university and student speech continuum]—the speech of student 
organizations, which arguably could be classified as mixed speech between the 
organization and the school whose name it uses—consistently has been classified by 
courts as purely student, nonmixed speech.”) (citing Good News Club v. Milford Cent. 
Sch., 533 U.S. 98, 119 (2001); Lamb’s Chapel v. Ctr. Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist., 
508 U.S. 384, 387 (1993); Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 277 (1981)). 
164 See Norton, supra note 162, at 1330. 
165 See generally Brownstein, supra note 6. Brownstein advocates for the creation of a 
whole new forum, the “nonforum,” where (1) government property and activities that are 
pervasively expressive in nature and serve intrinsically expressive functions; (2) 
circumstances where notions of federalism and separations of powers should preclude 
intrusive judicial review of speech regulations; and (3) the expressive activity reasonably 
bears the imprimatur of the state. Id. at 784. 
166 See Bowman, supra note 129, at 235. 
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lack of transparency permits the government to advance its policy 
positions without being held accountable for its advocacy.167 
However, if courts care to examine the mutual, co-existent 
interests involved in instances of mixed speech on college 
campuses, “this recognition would more accurately describe the 
speech itself.”168 
In sum, public universities are capable of expressive activity as 
government actors either by speaking themselves or endorsing 
private speakers to serve as their mouthpieces for views they 
endorse. Identifying the true “speaker” in cases of student speech 
on college campuses is rarely as straightforward as it seems, and a 
more rigorous inquiry by courts is needed on this front. 
B. What is the Forum? 
The difficulties in evaluating free speech claims on university 
campuses do not stop after determining the speaker(s) in a given 
case. “Mixed-speech” issues on university campuses are more 
complicated than simply determining who is speaking, and hastily 
basing decisions solely off the speaker’s identity can create even 
more analytical problems.169 Another embedded issue is evaluating 
the forum in which the speech is occurring. 
The type of forum in which the expression is made is a critical 
element to effectively assessing the rights of the speaker(s) and 
determining the permissible restrictions, if any, a university may 
put in place. More specifically, the purpose for which the forum 
                                                                                                             
167 See Corbin, supra note 162, at 608, 610. 
168 Bowman, supra note 129, at 236. But see R. George Wright, 31 S. ILL. U. L.J. 175, 
197–98 (2007) (“The law seeks to distinguish between speech by some party that is 
apparently or actually approved by the school from speech by the school itself, made 
officially on behalf of the school by an authorized agent of the school. At its simplest, 
then, the law seeks to distinguish between nonpublic forum speech that the school merely 
somehow approves or sponsors, and official speech on behalf of the school itself by its 
agents. The distinction between speech in a nonpublic forum that the school somehow 
sponsors and speech by or officially in the name of the school is inevitably vague, if it is 
tenable at all. We should therefore be reluctant to try to impose radically different free 
speech tests on such only hazily distinguishable categories.”). 
169 See Brownstein, supra note 6 at 751. 
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was created is highly significant.170 Some scholars have opined 
that the results reached in free speech cases occurring on university 
campuses are often inconsistent, if not wrong, largely because of 
the reviewing court’s preliminary articulation of the forum at 
issue.171 In other words, the way that a court classifies the context 
of the expression itself colors the free speech analysis because it 
often turns out to be inconsistent with, unreasonably interfere with, 
or fail to account for the forum’s actual stated purpose or intended 
use.172 Alternatively, examining the forum’s purpose may 
complicate identifying who the true speaker is or, if there are 
several speakers, recognizing all of the expressive interests at 
stake. If the university’s intent is to open the forum for different 
students as private speakers to express their own views, then a 
court can more easily attribute the speech to those students.173 By 
contrast, if the forum’s purpose, evidenced by the university’s 
intent, is to combine a number of select messages that represents 
the university’s own viewpoint or even speak for itself, then the 
speech more closely reflects the expression of the public university 
and can be treated as such.174 
Further, some First Amendment scholars have identified the 
government speech doctrine itself as a separate forum.175 Rather 
                                                                                                             
170 See Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 49 (1983) 
(“Implicit in the concept of the nonpublic forum is the right to make distinctions in access 
on the basis of subject matter and speaker identity . . . The touchstone for evaluating 
these distinctions is whether they are reasonable in light of the purpose which the forum 
at issue serves.”); see also Christian Legal Soc’y Chapter of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings 
Coll. of the Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 688–90 (2010). 
171 See, e.g., Brownstein, supra note 6, at 717–18, 721–23. 
172 See id. 
173 See generally Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); Rosenberger v. Rector & 
Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819 (1995). 
174 See generally Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666 (1998). 
175 Randall P. Bezanson, The Manner of Government Speech, 87 DENV. L. REV. 809, 
811 (2010). See also Bezanson & Buss, The Manner Faces of Government Speech, supra 
note 159, at 1406 (“In its most primitive form, the doctrine created a very nice 
compromise: it opened up government property for a constitutionally favored activity – 
the exercise of the freedom of speech—at minimal cost, given that speech in traditional 
public forums burdened the government’s ordinary use of its property very little.”). 
Although not stated quite so explicitly, Brownstein essentially suggests the same thing in 
his call to doctrinally establish his vision of the “nonforum.” See Brownstein, supra note 
6, at 785 (“The secondary thesis of this Part of the Article is that school-sponsored 
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than merely protecting the government’s ability to speak, “[the 
government speech doctrine] grants the government a forum for its 
expression that can span time, place, and space, and in which only 
ideas it favors may be spoken, and other ideas with which the 
government would ordinarily have to compete may be 
excluded.”176 This, again, alters the identification of who the owner 
of the expressive activity really is in a mixed speech case. Others 
still have gone so far as to argue that forum analysis is outright 
inapplicable when the government has an expressive interest; that 
if a university is speaking at all, in any expressive capacity, forum 
analysis becomes inappropriate because it ignores the interest in 
speech that is “arguably at least partially that of the school.”177 
Just as misidentifying the speaker can lead a court to analyze 
an incomplete picture of speech occurring on college campuses, so 
too does glossing over the identity of the forum in which the 
expression is occurring. As described above, this colors the 
analysis of free speech rights, even affecting the earlier 
identification of who the speaker is. Court analyzing First 
Amendment cases in the university setting must carefully identify 
the forum in which the speech at issue is occurring so as to 
examine the speech in light of the purpose of that forum. 
C. University Imprimatur and Educational Mission 
Even if an instance of mixed speech is properly understood to 
weigh more on the side of private speech by a student, institutions 
of higher education retain a strong interest in exercising some sort 
of control over its content.178 The associational properties of a 
student’s viewpoint ties the expression to the institution and 
implicates its imprimatur.179 Indeed, courts have supported the 
notion that public elementary schools have an interest in 
                                                                                                             
activities constitute a nonforum, and as such, government control of student speech in 
such activities should be shielded from free speech scrutiny.”). 
176 Bezanson, supra note 175, at 811. 
177 See Bowman, supra note 129, at 237–38, 276–78. 
178 “Private speech bearing the imprimatur of a school or of the state is problematic for 
a different reason. It creates a real risk that the content of private messages will be 
misattributed to government.” Brownstein, supra note 6, at 798. 
179 Cf. Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271, 281 (1988). 
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disassociating themselves from curricular speech that is 
inconsistent with the school’s “shared values of civilized order” or 
“associate[s] the school with any position other than neutrality on 
matters of political controversy.”180 The Supreme Court in 
Hazelwood School District v. Kuhlmeier recognized that public 
elementary schools may censor or otherwise exercise “editorial 
control” over student speech that could be reasonably perceived to 
bear the imprimatur of the school, so long as the restrictions are 
“reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns.”181 
Hazelwood’s holding was confined to the kindergarten to twelfth 
grade setting and the Court has not yet applied it to the higher 
education context;182 however, numerous federal circuit courts of 
appeal have analyzed Hazelwood and concluded that imprimatur 
concept does—or should—extend to the university level.183 
Though the concept of university imprimatur has largely been 
decided in cases involving school curricular activities,184 there 
seems to be little reason not to extend this principle to extra-
curricular speech as well.185 Many courts already justify applying 
                                                                                                             
180 Frank LoMonte, “The Key Word is Student”: Hazelwood Censorship Crashes the 
Ivy-Covered Gates, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 305, 317 (2013) (quoting Hazelwood, 262 
U.S. at 271–72). 
181 Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 273. 
182 Emily Gold Waldman, University Imprimaturs on Student Speech: The Certification 
Cases, 11 FIRST AMEND. L. REV. 382, 383 (2013) (arguing that a modified form of 
Hazelwood’s imprimatur rule should be applied to the unique situations presented in 
“certification cases” at the university level). 
183 See, e.g., Keeton v. Anderson-Wiley, 664 F.3d 865, 875 (11th Cir. 2011); Ward v. 
Polite, 667 F.3d 727, 735 (6th Cir. 2012); Axon-Flynn v. Johnson, 356 F.3d 1277, 1289 
(10th Cir. 2004). 
184 See, e.g., Hazelwood, 484 U.S. 260. 
185 The language defining the contours of Hazelwood is very broad. Justice White, 
writing for the majority, explained that school-sponsored activities “may fairly be 
characterized as part of the school curriculum, whether or not they occur in a traditional 
classroom setting, so long as they are supervised by faculty members and designed to 
impart particular knowledge or skills to student participants and audiences.” Hazelwood, 
484 U.S. at 271; see also Brownstein, supra note 6, at 763; Bowman, supra note 129, at 
275–78. But cf. Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 715 n.8 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(Kelly, J., concurring) (stating the opposing viewpoint that Hazelwood is limited to 
instances “supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge 
or skills to student participants and audiences”) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 271); 
LoMonte, supra note 180, at 362 (“Although Hazelwood did not deprive students of all 
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Hazelwood’s principles to speech occurring well outside of the 
curricular setting.186 Indeed, the notion that learning outside the 
classroom is not new—involvement with student organizations and 
other extra-curricular activities still serves the purposes and 
pedagogical goals of higher education institutions by encouraging 
intellectual growth and maturation.187 
Even when not bearing the direct imprimatur of the educational 
institution, schools may restrict speech that is—or is perceived to 
be—inconsistent with its educational mission. The Supreme Court 
in Morse v. Frederick188 decided that it did not violate students’ 
First Amendment rights to be restricted in wielding a banner at a 
school-sponsored rally that said “Bong Hits 4 Jesus.”189 The Court 
found that because the message could reasonably be construed to 
endorse the use of illegal drugs, in violation of school policy, the 
school had a special interest in disassociation from such speech in 
the educational setting, even where the rally occurred outside of 
the curriculum.190 Though the school’s imprimatur was not directly 
implicated, because no “reasonable” observer would perceive the 
students’ speech as bearing the school’s endorsement, Morse 
                                                                                                             
First Amendment protection—the burden remains on the government to come forward 
with a justification “reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns”—in practice, 
the Hazelwood standard has become a virtual rubber stamp for whatever excuse for 
censorship a school can muster.”). 
186 Brownstein, supra note 6, at 763–65, 769 n.170, 818 n.285. 
187 E.g. Planned Parenthood of S. Nev., Inc. v. Clark Cty. Sch. Dist., 941 F.2d 817, 825 
(9th Cir. 1991) (“High schools foster learning experiences inside and outside the 
classroom and serve pedagogical as well as in locus parenti purposes.”); see also Brad 
Dickens, Reclaiming Hazelwood: Public School Classrooms and  Return to the Supreme 
Court’s Vision for Viewpoint-Specific Speech Regulation Policy,16 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 
529, 549 (2013) (concluding that the Supreme Court intended Hazelwood to apply in 
narrow instances where schools must have complete control over “speech that appears to 
be the official voice and opinion of the school and ultimately the government”; 
necessarily, “[v]iewpoint neutrality simply has no place within an accurate reading of 
Hazelwood”). 
188 551 U.S. 393 (2007). 
189 Id. at 400. 
190 See id. at 408 (“The “special characteristics of the school environment and the 
governmental interest in stopping student drug abuse—reflected in the policies of 
Congress and myriad school boards, including JDHS—allow schools to restrict student 
expression that they reasonably regard as promoting illegal drug use.”) (internal citations 
omitted). 
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supports the notion that at least some viewpoint discrimination in 
the education setting is permissible when it implicates core 
concerns of a school’s educational mission.191 
However, the Supreme Court has also noted that “[t]he 
proposition that schools do not endorse everything they fail to 
censor is not complicated.”192 Indeed, the private speech at issue 
must be somehow attributable to the university, or its core 
educational mission, for it to bear the imprimatur of the school.193 
Nevertheless, Hazelwood has been applied in instances where the 
speech at issue cannot reasonably be attributed to or mistaken for 
endorsement by the educational institution, often in an effort by 
courts to reconcile the institution’s interest in the speech with the 
students’ own expressive rights.194 Though, whether the speech at 
issue bears the imprimatur of the school is a prime point of 
contention among judges and scholars alike,195 and failing to 
                                                                                                             
191 See LoMonte, supra note 180, at 307 & n.14. 
192 Bd. of Educ. of Westside Cmty. Sch. v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, 250 (1990). 
193 Compare Hazelwood Sch. Dist v. Kulmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271 (1988) (concluding 
that “the question whether the First Amendment requires a school affirmatively to 
promote particular student speech” “concerns educators’ authority over school-sponsored 
publications, theatrical productions, and other expressive activities that students, parents, 
and members of the public might reasonably perceive to bear the imprimatur of the 
school. These activities may fairly be characterized as part of the school curriculum, 
whether or not they occur in a traditional classroom setting, so long as they are 
supervised by faculty members and designed to impart particular knowledge or skills to 
student participants and audiences.”) with Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 405 (2007) 
(“Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one would reasonably believe that [the 
student’s] banner [advocating drug use] bore the school’s imprimatur.”). 
194 Le Monde, supra note 180, at 320–21 (“Courts have applied Hazelwood even where 
no reasonable listener would confuse the individual speech for the officially sanctioned 
word of the school.”); see, e.g., C.H. v. Olivia, 226 F.3d 198, 213 (3rd Cir. 2000) (en 
banc); Poling v. Murphy, 872 F.2d 757 (6th Cir. 1984); Bannon v. Sch. Dist. Palm Beach 
Cty., 387 F.3d 1208 (11th Cir. 2004). 
195 “While Hazelwood certainly applies to many things that occur in the classroom . . . 
nothing in Hazelwood suggests that its standard applies when a student is called upon to 
express his or her personal views in class or in an assignment. On the contrary, 
Hazelwood governs only those expressive activities that might reasonably be perceived 
‘to bear the imprimatur of the school.’ . . . Things that students express in class or in 
assignments when called upon to express their own views do not ‘bear the imprimatur of 
the school’ . . . and do not represent ‘the [school’s] own speech.’” Olivia, 226 F.3d 198, 
213–14 (3d Cir. 2000) (Alito, J., dissenting) (quoting Hazelwood, 484 U.S. at 
271; Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 834 (1995)). 
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recognize this tension completely ignores a university’s competing 
interest in the speech on its campus.196 
Even where instances of mixed speech on college campuses 
can most reasonably be attributed to student-based speakers, there 
are instances, described above, where that private speech 
nevertheless implicates the imprimatur and implicit endorsement 
of the university. To fully analyze the speech rights at issue, a 
reviewing court should be cognizant of if and how student-
dominant speech can bear expressive qualities of the university 
with which the student affiliates. 
III. ANALYSIS: DARKENING THE MUDDIED WATERS OF FIRST 
AMENDMENT RIGHTS ON COLLEGE CAMPUSES 
After exploring the complexities of mixed speech instances on 
college campuses, it is more than apparent that there is no easily 
navigable analysis. The lack of coherent doctrinal framework has 
frustrated constitutional law scholars and judges alike, while 
further imposing hardships on higher education institutions in 
negotiating how they decide to respect expressive activities 
occurring on campus. 
Yet courts, like the Eighth Circuit in Gerlich, continue to 
resolve free speech disputes between students and their university 
without engaging with the nuances examined above in any 
meaningful way.197 The issues surrounding the speech interests in 
Gerlich are much more nuanced—and have much greater 
ramifications—than the Eighth Circuit’s ruling reflects. While the 
Gerlich Court was likely correct in its ultimate conclusion—that 
post hoc viewpoint discrimination runs counter to fundamental 
principles embodied in the First Amendment198—it nevertheless 
                                                                                                             
196 See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 798 (“Private speech bearing the imprimatur of a 
school or of the state is problematic for a different reason. It creates a real risk that the 
content of private messages will be misattributed to government.”). 
197 See infra Part II, and accompanying discussion. See also Corbin, supra note 17, at 
672 (noting the inconsistent approaches the Supreme Court, and lower courts, have taken 
to analyze cases that present the dilemma of “mixed speech”). 
198 Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 705 (8th Cir. 2017). Indeed, “[c]onduct 
may be prohibited or regulated, within broad limits. But government may not 
816         FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. XXVIII:777 
 
misses the analytical mark in its forum analysis. At the same time, 
neither the position advanced by ISU,199 nor that of NORML,200 
successfully articulates the intricacies of First Amendment 
jurisprudence in the university setting or properly resolves their 
conflicting expressive interests. As discussed below, the Gerlich 
decision summarily dismisses the complexity of mixed speech 
instances on college campuses and declines to acknowledge the 
inherent interest that higher education institutions have in the use 
of their intellectual property by student organizations. In short, the 
court could have been reached the same conclusion with a more 
rigorous free speech analysis examining the full spectrum of 
expressive interests at stake in this instance of “mixed speech.” 
The following Parts will examine each position in turn. 
A. Viability of the Government Speech Doctrine 
First and foremost, the Gerlich Court too quickly and 
summarily dismissed the expressive qualities of ISU’s trademark 
and the university’s interest in student groups’, like NORML, use 
of its intellectual property. Instead of engaging in a meaningful 
discussion of the points raised by the university, the Court assumed 
the trademark constituted a limited public forum and summarily 
concluded “[t]he government speech doctrine does not apply if a 
government entity has created a limited public forum for 
speech.”201 This circular logic is at odds with a comprehensive 
analysis of instances of mixed speech and demonstrates how courts 
can come to predetermined conclusions when the identity of the 
speaker and nature of the forum are glossed over without a more 
searching inquiry about the character of the expression in 
question.202 
                                                                                                             
discriminate against people because it dislikes their ideas, not even when the ideas 
include advocating that certain conduct now criminal be legalized.” Gay and Lesbian 
Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 368 (8th Cir. 1988). 
199 See generally supra Part I.B.1 (laying out the arguments advanced on appeal by 
ISU). 
200 See generally supra Part I.B.2 (laying out the arguments advanced on appeal by 
NORML). 
201 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 707. 
202 See supra Parts II.A–B. 
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The principles behind the government speech doctrine are 
certainly important to consider when analyzing instances of 
“mixed speech,” as in the present case. In some instances, it could 
be possible to treat mixed speech as if it were government 
speech.203 Universities do, and should, have the ability to 
selectively license their trademarks. At the very least, account 
should be taken for when a university’s imprimatur is implicated; 
even as an institution of higher education, ISU should be able to 
disassociate itself from matters of political controversy and express 
neutrality on matters occurring within the curriculum.204  As 
discussed above, there are at least some compelling reasons to 
extend this rationale to extra-curricular speech that serves 
pedagogical goals as well.205 If trademarks are in fact inherently 
expressive devices, then the Gerlich court erred in wholly ignoring 
the fact that ISU in some way retains expressive interests by 
licensing its trademarks to student organizations. 
Nevertheless, the Eighth Circuit appropriately declined to rule 
that the trademark constituted government speech. The 
consequences of classifying ISU’s trademark as government 
speech ultimately outweigh its utility to ISU; the doctrine is 
inconsistent with the applicable First Amendment jurisprudence 
regarding speech rights on college campuses. If the government 
speech doctrine were to apply to ISU’s trademark, then student 
groups denied access to its use would be entirely cut off from any 
redress by courts, as the trademark would be exempt from First 
Amendment protection.206 What would stop a university like ISU 
from only allowing its trademark to be used by student 
organizations with conservative (or, vice-versa, liberal) 
ideologies?207 If the university’s aim is to “speak” in support of 
                                                                                                             
203 See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 789. 
204 Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 271–72 (1988). 
205 See supra Part III.C; Bowman, supra note 129, at 276–78. 
206 Bowman, supra note 129, at 230. 
207 The need to guard against partisan restrictions on speech has long been recognized 
by the Supreme Court. See, e.g., Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 180–81 (1972) (“The 
college classroom with its surrounding environs is peculiarly the ‘marketplace of ideas,’ 
and we break no new constitutional ground in reaffirming this Nation’s dedication to 
safeguarding academic freedom.”). 
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these viewpoints and adopt them to be recognized as its own, to the 
exclusion of contrary views, the parallels to blatant viewpoint 
suppression surrounding cases like Healy and Rosenberger are 
clear. On the other hand, if the university’s goal in licensing its 
trademark to student groups is to achieve a “diversity of views” to 
represent it, then the university is not really achieving its own goal. 
Further still, application of the government speech doctrine to 
the facts of Gerlich undermines the rationale on which university 
control of its own speech is based. If the government speech 
doctrine is premised on the idea that public entities should be able 
to control their own message,208 then a university should not be 
able to censure certain speech just because it is not aligned with its 
expressive interest; rather, censorship may make sense where the 
speech actually interferes with the university’s own message and 
educational mission.209 Otherwise, the university risks nullifying 
the speech interests of its students. Understood in this way, it was 
not appropriate to apply the government speech doctrine to 
NORML’s use of ISU’s trademark because the group’s message 
was not, in fact, interfering with ISU’s educational mission. While 
not advocating for drug use, which might be permissibly censored 
under Morse, political dialogue and advocacy for legislative 
change is certainly consistent with the educational mission of an 
institution of higher education like ISU. 
B. Muddied Waters of Forum Analysis 
Even if the Gerlich court was doctrinally correct in refusing to 
extend the government speech doctrine to the case of university 
trademarks, it was not necessarily appropriate for it to consider the 
trademark a limited public forum.210 In the case of ISU’s 
trademark, the Eighth Circuit failed to appreciate the purpose for 
which such a forum would have been created by the university.211 
                                                                                                             
208 See Bowman, supra note 129, at 282. 
209 See Morse v. Frederick, 551 U.S. 393, 423–24 (2007) (Alito, J., concurring); 
Bowman, supra note 129, at 282. 
210 See Gerlich v. Leath (Gerlich III), 861 F.3d 697, 705, 707 (8th Cir. 2017) 
(identifying the university’s trademark as a limited public forum). 
211 Compare id. at 714 (Kelly, J., concurring) (assuming without discussing ISU’s 
purported purpose of its trademark as a “forum” for student expression) with id. at 719–
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The purpose for which a forum is made accessible to the public for 
private expression is a central feature of a limited public forum; the 
purpose of the forum is what actually dictates whether the 
distinction between allowed and excluded speech is permissible 
under the First Amendment.212 Yet courts have routinely failed to 
consider the nature and purpose of government property,213 despite 
the Supreme Court holding that as much is necessary in evaluating 
the permissibility of censorship in a university’s limited  
public forum.214 
The purpose of ISU’s trademark licensing scheme (like that of 
any other public university) was presumably to enhance the image 
of the university and lend support to the messages of student 
groups that were not inconsistent with its educational mission and 
cultivated public image.215 The Student Organization Guidelines 
demonstrate this limited scope of the “forum,” expressly granting 
student organizations the privilege of using ISU’s trademarks, 
subject to certain criteria.216 Student organizations like NORML 
are certainly not entitled to use ISU’s trademark; they must fulfill 
the requirements of ISU’s trademark use policy and fill out an 
                                                                                                             
20 (Loken, J., dissenting) (recounting that “a limited public forum is not created absent 
clear intent to create a public forum” and noting ISU’s “central purpose was to protect 
and promote ISU’s public image, and the program guidelines explicitly reserve[d] the 
forum for this purpose” which contributed to the complexity of the majority’s forum 
analysis (citing Hazelwood v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 270–71 (1988))). 
212 See Christian Legal Soc’y Ch. of the Univ. of Cal., Hastings Coll. of the Law v. 
Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 687–88 (2010) (holding that, even in a limited public forum, a 
university cannot exclude speech where the distinction is not reasonable view in light of 
the purpose of the forum); Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Ed. Fund, Inc., 473 
U.S. 788, 806 (1985) (“Control over access to a nonpublic forum can be based on subject 
matter and speaker identity so long as the distinctions drawn are reasonable in light of the 
purpose served by the forum and are viewpoint neutral.”). 
213 See Brownstein, supra note 6, at 787 nn.232–33 (citing Robert Post, Between 
Governance and Management: The History and Theory of the Public Forum, 34 UCLA 
L. REV. 1713, 1784–85 (1987) and Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional First 
Amendment, 89 MINN. L. REV. 1256, 1262–64 (2005)). 
214 Perry Educ. Ass’n v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983); see also 
Martinez, 561 U.S. at 687–88. 
215 See Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 3–4; Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 719–20 
(Loken, J., dissenting). 
216 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 719–20 (Loken, J., dissenting); Trademark Management 
Policy Statement, supra, note 27. 
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application that lays out its proposed design incorporating the 
trademark.217 Students are not given permission to use it unless it 
conforms to specified guidelines.218 Indeed, Gerlich more closely 
resembles an instance where the university has merely “reserved 
eligibility” for a class of speakers who must then “individually, 
obtain permission”—and the Supreme Court in Forbes has 
specifically stated that such instances do not create a limited public 
forum.219 
The Gerlich court’s forum analysis is weakened also because 
its reliance on traditional student speech cases not implicating the 
expressive interests of a university trademark is tenuous. Unlike 
Rosenberger220 and Gohn221, where university recognition and 
funding was overtly necessary for the student groups to exercise 
their First Amendment rights to association and free expression at 
all,222 the speech of student organizations like NORML who are 
denied use of ISU’s trademark is not actually cut off. In 
Rosenberger and Gohn, funding was required in order for the 
students to advocate for their viewpoint on gender and sexual 
equality and effectively speak as a student organization on 
campus.223 The Gerlich court’s reference to Martinez,224 
Widmar,225 and Healy,226 in addition to Rosenberger, as “four 
cases [in which] the Supreme Court has held that a university 
                                                                                                             
217 See generally Guidelines for University Trademark Use by Student and Campus 
Organizations, supra note 50. 
218 See generally id. 
219 See Ark. Ed. Television Comm’n v. Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 670 (1998). 
220 See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 705 (citing Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the 
Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 829 (1995)). 
221 See id. at 705, 707 (discussing and analogizing the facts in Gerlich to those in Gay 
and Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362–67 (8th Cir. 1988)); see also 
supra note 109 (discussing the facts of Gohn and its parallels nearly one decade prior to 
Rosenberger). 
222 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 830, 836 (noting that permitting viewpoint 
discrimination in the funding of student organizations would exclude those viewpoints 
from campus); Gohn, 850 F.2d at 366–68 (same). 
223 See Rosenberger, 515 U.S. at 823. 
224 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 710–11 (Kelly, J., concurring) (citing Christian Legal Soc’y 
Chapter of Univ. Cal., Hastings Coll. Law v. Martinez, 561 U.S. 661, 685 (2010)). 
225 Id. (citing Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981)). 
226 Id. (citing Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 181–82 (1972)). 
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creates a limited public forum when it distributes benefits to 
recognized student groups” similarly misses this point.227 
Analogies to Martinez suffer the same critique as Rosenberger and 
Gohn in that imposing a school-wide nondiscrimination policy on 
student groups’ operations created prerequisite conditions for the 
student organization, and its speech, to occur on campus in the first 
place.228 Similarly, university policy in Widmar, excluding 
religious groups from the institution’s “open forum policy,” 
manifestly denied religious groups the ability to express 
themselves on campus.229 And the socialist student organization in 
Healy depended on university recognition to exist on campus at 
all.230 These cases are in stark contrast to the ultimate 
consequences of denying a student group use of a trademark. 
Student organizations like NORML still possess the ability to 
speak on campus through their t-shirts without the use of the 
university trademark. Alternatively, NORML students could have 
altered their mode of expression to comply with ISU guidelines, 
without changing their substantive message or viewpoint, to speak 
with the trademark. In fact, ISU made it clear that NORML could 
use its trademark to advocate the same pro-marijuana legislation 
message by simply removing any explicit mention or image of a 
marijuana leaf.231 Comparatively, NORML’s injury in being 
denied permission to use ISU’s trademark can at best be described 
as an indirect burden on its expression. 
The nature of the “forum” in these cases is different as well. In 
both Rosenberger and Gohn, the university funds granted to 
student organizations passed from the university to the students 
themselves to be spent upon their own volition in pursuit of their 
advocacy.232 By contrast, even though NORML conveyed 
considerable expression of its own through ISU’s trademark, 
property rights to ISU’s trademark never changed hands. ISU at all 
                                                                                                             
227 See id. at 710–11 (Kelly, J., concurring). 
228 See Martinez, 561 U.S. at 685. 
229 Widmar, 454 U.S. at 269. 
230 See Healy, 408 U.S at 181–82. 
231 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 703. 
232 See Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 825–26 
(1995); Gay & Lesbian Students Ass’n v. Gohn, 850 F.2d 361, 362–63 (8th Cir. 1988). 
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times owned and possessed its intellectual property, even though 
use was permitted.233 ISU retained a vested property interest in its 
trademark’s value, which the Gerlich court ignored.234 This begs 
the question: If ISU created a limited public forum by making its 
trademark available to student organizations, does it similarly do 
so when licensing them to private companies outside the 
university? Does the university then impermissibly discriminate 
based on viewpoint every time it rejects a third party’s trademark 
license application? 
The concurring opinion in Gerlich brings a persuasive 
counterargument to this point.235 It was undisputed that ISU 
adopted its trademark policy changes after NORML used its initial 
design.236 The design was not disapproved on the basis of its 
reference to drugs in the first instance, so why was it a matter of 
such concern the second time around? The concurrence correctly 
points to Supreme Court case law decreeing that “[t]he existence of 
reasonable grounds for limiting access to [even a] nonpublic 
forum . . . will not save a regulation that is in reality a façade for 
viewpoint-based discrimination.”237 Indeed, universities, and the 
government at large, cannot be allowed to censor speech after the 
fact, only when certain ramifications of the speech that it does not 
like occur.238 At the end of the day, it is not quite defensible to 
assert, as ISU did throughout litigation, that it did not engage in 
viewpoint discrimination against NORML and its student 
participants. Yet, it is simply incorrect to state that ISU, as a 
government entity, did not possess expressive interests or a 
viewpoint of its own associated with its registered trademark only 
because it had lent out use of the trademark to student groups 
expressing a wide variety of views.239 
                                                                                                             
233 See generally Trademark Management Policy, supra note 27; Guidelines for 
University Trademark Use by Student and Campus Organizations, supra note 50. 
234 See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 697. 
235 See id. at 710–16 (Kelly, J., concurring). 
236 See id. at 701–03. 
237 Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Def. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 811 (1985). 
238 See Hosty v. Carter, 412 F.3d 731 (2005). 
239 See supra note 94 and accompanying text; cf. Ark. Educ. Television Comm’n v. 
Forbes, 523 U.S. 666, 679–80 (1998) (distinguishing between cases of “general access” 
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On the other hand, it is an inescapable conclusion that 
universities perform viewpoint discrimination in one way or 
another, whether it be in the classroom or out. Indeed, “viewpoint 
discrimination is inextricably a part of education. One cannot 
communicate the messages involved in an educational process 
without exercising choice—without choosing some messages and 
not others; and without making these choices on the basis of the 
content of the available alternatives.”240 If universities are to be 
financially and organizationally operable, without every decision 
instigating dispute and litigation, then First Amendment analysis of 
student speech rights must accommodate some degree of viewpoint 
discrimination that is currently not permissible in forum analysis. 
However, it can be safely said, as Judge Kelly’s concurrence 
pointed out, that it is clearly established that public universities 
cannot do so “simply because it finds the views expressed by any 
group to be abhorrent.”241 
IV. RECOMMENDATION: LESSONS FROM THE GERLICH CLASSROOM 
Once courts accept that there are instances where expressive 
activity carries the interests of both students and their university, it 
is clear that a new approach must be taken to understanding these 
instances of “mixed speech” where such interests are competing 
and, often, entirely at odds. The Gerlich case on the campus of 
Iowa State University presents one such instance—mixed-speech 
cases in the university setting are not new, and will not go away.242 
                                                                                                             
that constitute a designated or limited public forum, and “selective access” which 
constitute nonpublic a forum). 
240 Bezanson & Buss, supra note 159, at 1420. 
241 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 715 (Kelly, J., concurring) (quoting Healy v. James, 408 
U.S. 169, 187–88 (1972)). 
242 Social media and online technology are already playing a large role in school speech 
cases. See Page v. Lexington Cty. Sch. Dist., 531 F.3d 275, 281 (4th Cir. 2008) (ruling 
that a public school district’s use of its website to promote a position on pending 
legislation before the state legislature constitute government speech not subject to First 
Amendment scrutiny). Access to speech on government-maintained social media sites is 
also a subject of debate among scholars. See generally Alissa Ardito, Social Media, 
Administrative Agencies, and the First Amendment, 65 ADMIN. L. REV. 301 (2013) 
(arguing that, while some have argued for application of the government speech doctrine 
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While there are certainly more intellectually-rigorous pursuits that 
courts can—and should—embark on when analyzing free speech 
claims from students expressing themselves on university 
campuses, there are also more practical approaches that institutions 
of higher education can pursue when navigating the muddied 
waters of student free speech rights to fairly accommodate student 
expression on campus. 
A. Judicial Approaches to “Mixed Speech” Issues on College 
Campuses 
First and foremost, courts should stop viewing speech 
occurring in the higher education setting on a public-private 
binary. As described above, this system pits the interests of higher 
education institutions in maintaining their image against the 
interests of their students in seeking to grow as intellectuals and 
citizens. It is, ultimately, a zero-sum game. And the Gerlich ruling 
perpetuates this zero-sum confrontation between ISU and its 
students.243 The result of similar rulings will be to exacerbate and 
intensify relations between university officials and students on 
campuses across the country, at a time when tensions among 
civically-minded students are already at an all-time high.244 
Judicial rulings that take the time to weigh the respective interests 
of both parties, by contrast, recognize the fact that both parties are 
                                                                                                             
to federal government agency social media sites, public forum analysis is more 
appropriate). 
243 See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 705. 
244 See generally Erica Goldberg, Competing Free Speech Values in an Age of Protest, 
39 CARDOZO L. REV. 2163 (2018) (noting that conflicting speech rights, both between 
students and between students and their universities, have been occurring with greater 
frequency and adding to heightened political tension on college campuses). The tensions 
existing on the campus of the University of California, Berkeley are an especially apt 
example of what is in store for universities when student free speech rights are not 
properly defined. See Conor Friedersdorf, UC Berkeley Declares Itself Unsafe for Ann 
Coulter, THE ATLANTIC (Apr. 20, 2017), 
https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2017/04/uc-berkeley-declares-itself-unsafe-
for-ann-coulter/523668/ [https://perma.cc/Z6FN-ZXFW]; see also Eugene Volokh, UC 
Berkeley’s Chancellor’s Message on Free Speech, WASHINGTON POST (Aug. 23, 2017), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-conspiracy/wp/2017/08/23/uc-berkeley-
chancellors-message-on-free-speech/?utm_term=.2a6b805153b6 
[https://perma.cc/UTW7-MCTJ]. 
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engaging in constitutionally-significant expressive activity. Even if 
a court ultimately concludes that the speech rights of the students 
involved (or their on-campus organizations) should prevail in a 
given First Amendment showdown, such a result is more 
intellectually honest and in practice achieves a more just result.245 
In the Gerlich case, it can hardly be disputed that ISU has a 
legitimate proprietary interest in the use of its trademark. However, 
the particular facts of this case ultimately condemn it, even under a 
more favorable analysis. While recognizing that ISU has a 
significant interest in the use of its intentionally-branded 
trademark, courts and the legal community should not accept the 
fact that ISU changed its policies specifically to exclude 
NORML’s proposed message as rationale for maintaining the 
university’s expressive interest in its trademark. 
B. Lessons from Gerlich: What Higher Education Institutions Can 
Do to Limit Liability When Licensing Official University 
Trademarks to Student Organizations 
Aside from the more academic discussion in analyzing Free 
Speech claims from students on college campuses, colleges and 
                                                                                                             
245 Applying Hazelwood might be a strong temptation for courts seeking to confront the 
concerns addressed in this Article and balance the conflicting expressive interests present 
in mixed speech cases. University trademarks certainly carry the imprimatur of the school 
with which they associate. In its application to Gerlich, for instance, where the trademark 
is used by a student organization, NORML intended their message to be associated with 
ISU and the organization’s message was, in fact, attributed to the school. See Gerlich III, 
861 F.3d at 701–04; Brief for Appellant, supra note 30, at 9. Cf. Morse v. Frederick, 551 
U.S. 393, 405 (“Kuhlmeier does not control this case because no one could reasonably 
believe that [the student’s] banner bore the school’s imprimatur.”). But Hazelwood’s 
applicability, even under a generous reading of that case, is tenuous at best. Hazelwood’s 
core recognition of the school’s imprimatur is central to recognizing that university 
activity may impute expressive interests into an instance of student speech to create a 
mixed speech dilemma. But in the case of student organizations’ use of the university’s 
trademark, there is no immediate pedagogical interest at stake or even direct faculty 
oversight. See Dickens, supra note 187; LoMonte, supra note 180, at 362–63 (“Although 
Hazelwood did not deprive students of all First Amendment protection—the burden 
remains on the government to come forward with a justification “reasonably related to 
legitimate pedagogical concerns”—in practice, the Hazelwood standard has become a 
virtual rubber stamp for whatever excuse for censorship a school can muster.”). 
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universities can take Gerlich as a learning opportunity to 
accommodate student speech while managing its own expressive 
interests. Gerlich illustrates how to avoid legal pitfalls and 
negative publicity.246 Crucially, institutions of higher education 
must expressly define those “forums” which are opened to 
expressive use by student organizations and others seeking 
association with the university through their trademarks. 
Universities must, in other words, preemptively declare the 
purpose for which that intellectual property “forum” is available 
for use by student organizations. Just as universities can publically 
declare for what specific type of expression and association they 
intend to make an empty classroom available after hours, they can 
similarly articulate the extent to which their trademarks are 
available for student use. At least one university has already done 
so, broadly reserving the right to restrict the future use of any 
“forum” associated with that university to its defined purpose, 
while maintaining its ability to also promote its own message.247 
Along these lines, a general policy on usage standards 
articulating the permitted and prohibited uses of the licensed 
trademark would serve universities well as a pre-established, 
viewpoint-neutral standard to manage its institutional message and 
associational imprimatur.248  Specific to Gerlich and university 
trademark policies, higher education institutions should include in 
their policies a declaration of what it intends the trademark to 
convey and the purpose behind licensees’ use.249 
Whether it is a university’s intent to endorse a specific message 
of a particular student group, adopt an array of diverse and 
multifaceted viewpoints, or convey its own institutional message, a 
university can and should take the opportunity to articulate its 
official trademark use policy. Doing so establishes clarity and 
transparency to place interested licensees, such as student 
                                                                                                             
246 See generally Gerlich III, 861 F.3d 697 (8th Cir. 2017). 
247 Emory University Open Expression Committee, In re Emory Integrity Project 
Chalkboards and Other Limited Public Forums (Sept. 26, 2017), 
http://senate.emory.edu/documents/2017%20-%202018/cfoe-limpubforum-6.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/35PD-WMKX]. 
248 Six Top Tips for Your Internal Trademark Licensing Policies, supra note 114. 
249 Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 701. 
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organizations, on notice of university expectations. Moreover, 
strategic planning on an official usage standard aids in the 
prevention of highly public confrontations with its students and 
embarrassing public fallout; at the same time, it also avoids First 
Amendment violations against its students. Gerlich should serve as 
a wake-up call to higher education institutions across the country: 
failing to articulate and define the university’s own expressive 
interests and the standards of associational messaging like 
trademarks invites conflict between university officials and student 
groups. In sum, higher education institutions should have a 
thoroughly thought-out, well-articulated, and defined policy 
regarding their students’ use of their intellectual property—written 
and reviewed by legal counsel. An important takeaway from 
Gerlich is that the restrictions ISU put in place would almost 
certainly have been constitutionally permissible had they been 
established from the onset of NORML’s use of the trademark, as 
opposed to being established as a response to the group’s 
controversial viewpoint.250 
As a final and obvious point, universities should not deviate 
from their established trademark use policies and involve legal 
counsel earlier in the process when handling interactions between 
the university and its student organizations to ensure compliance. 
This is true even regarding those interactions that do not involve 
the use of university trademarks. Student affairs concerning the 
freedom of speech—especially those touching controversial social 
and political issues—have become highly sensitive matters that 
require careful forethought and planning to avoid constitutional 
infirmity.251 In short, universities must do anything they can to 
avoid allegations of viewpoint discrimination by applying their use 
standards and licensing requirements equally to all groups. And 
                                                                                                             
250 See Morse, 551 U.S. at 410 (holding a school does not violate the First Amendment 
by restricting speech that is inconsistent with or reasonably viewed to violate established 
school policy). 
251 For a recent example of a university caught in the cross-fire between politically-
engaged students and an ideologically-opposed public speaker, see Scott Jaschik, Ann 
Coulter vs. Berkeley, Round 2, INSIDE HIGHER ED (April 24, 2017), https://
www.insidehighered.com/news/2017/04/24/new-round-debate-over-ann-coulter-and-her-
right-speak-berkeley [https://perma.cc/95VM-XNJA]. 
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when the instance arises when the license to use a trademark is 
denied, universities should thoroughly explain why the license 
application was denied and work with the student organization to 
help cure the defect.252 Gerlich serves as a case in point. Even if 
the underlying rationale behind the Gerlich decision is 
conceptually flawed, the fact remains that the change in trademark 
use policy was a direct reaction to NORML’s legislative advocacy 
and the publicity it received; the timing of ISU officials’ actions 
cannot be ignored.253 Had legal counsel been involved earlier, and 
a more thoroughly-prepared licensee use policy defining the ISU’s 
expressive interest established and adhered to, a thought-out 
approach to altering the university’s trademark-use policy could 
have been crafted to achieve its needs without serving as a 
rebuke—intentional or not—to the viewpoint expressed by 
students seeking to use the trademark in association with their 
campus organization.254 In short, the best measure institutions of 
higher education can take is to employ legally-trained 
professionals to engage and forge relationships with the students at 
the heart of ideological debates, establishing the university’s role 
in student expression and political discourse before it is caught in 
an undesirable position. 
CONCLUSION 
Instances of speech and expression on college campuses are 
rarely as straightforward as they appear—Gerlich v. Leath 
provides an excellent example of how some speech by university 
students naturally implicates legitimate concerns and interests by 
institutions of higher education.255 Courts presiding over campus 
speech disputes often fail to recognize such cases as “mixed 
speech” incidences, which has led to an incoherent and messy 
body of case law.256 As it currently stands, First Amendment 
jurisprudence fails to reconcile these two often competing interests 
                                                                                                             
252 Six Top Tips for Your Internal Trademark Licensing Policies, supra note 114. 
253 See Gerlich III, 861 F.3d at 697. 
254 See id. 
255 See id. 
256 See discussion supra Part III.A. 
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in expressive activity on college campuses.257 Gerlich is no 
different.258 Yet, both parties’ arguments in Gerlich miss the 
mark.259 Classifying student expression that implicates the 
university’s imprimatur or public image, like ISU’s federally-
registered trademark, as government speech is problematic in that 
it wholly exempts the students’ speech from judicial review and 
protection of the First Amendment.260 On the other hand, a 
doctrine that automatically allows a federal court to label a 
university’s intellectual property a “limited public forum” without 
further inquiry ignores the institution’s proprietary interest and 
associational concerns with the trademark’s  use.261 Courts can 
learn from the Gerlich decision by opting out of this public-private 
binary, and fairly adjudicating the merits of each party’s interests 
in the expressive activity. This process would establish a way for 
universities to navigate the tumultuous political activity occurring 
on their campuses. Finally, higher education institutions should 
learn from Gerlich and craft their trademark use policies in such a 
way as to articulate the university’s First Amendment interest in 
the trademark and narrowly define the purpose for which it is to 
serve as a “forum” for student expression.262 
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